


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This study examines the impact of the United States ground troop withdrawal from the Republic of Korea on Japan's national security, Japan's vital interests, her Self-Defense Force, and the status of the United States-Japan security treaty provide a basis for analyzing her current national security program.

The effect of the withdrawal is weighed against America's changing role in Asia and Japan's perception of the threat in East Asia. Based upon the Japanese assessment of these developments, six major options have been examined as choices for Japan as she responds to the changes in this region.

In the final analysis, it is anticipated that the United States withdrawal of ground troops in the short-term will not be significant. As long as the United States-Japan security treaty is credible and continues to serve as the cornerstone in this relationship, Japan's national security structure will remain relatively unchanged. In the long-term, however, it is probable that Japan will take precautionary steps to obviate the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of another armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, the most likely option for Japan will be a selective and conventional course of rearmament involving the continuation of her incremental advances and improvements in her current force structure.

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Japan's National Security?

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A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty
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HOW WILL THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AFFECT
JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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HOW WILL THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AFFECT JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY?, by Major Bowman M. Olds, USA, 118 pages.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Comrades, reunifying our divided country is the greatest national duty and the most important revolutionary task for our Party and our people.

-Kim Il-sung,¹
October 9, 1975

I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea

-Jimmy Carter,²
June 23, 1976

The campaign pledge made by Jimmy Carter went into effect on December 13, 1978 when the first increment of American ground forces from the Republic of Korea (ROK) landed at Forbes Air Force Base in Kansas. The withdrawal schedule calls for the redeployment of 6,000 troops by the close of 1979 followed by 9,000 additional personnel not later than June 1980. The final contingent of ground combat troops programmed to leave Korea during 1981 and 1982 will consist of the remaining elements of the 2d Infantry Division Headquarters and two maneuver brigades. The remaining US Army elements in Korea will consist of 7,000 combat support and combat service support troops, a contingent to staff the Combined Forces Command, and 9,000 US Air Force personnel.³

Less than a month after the first American battalion departed from the ROK, intelligence reports revealed that the estimated number of 25 North Korean divisions was in error.⁴ Instead, the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (DPRK) is now credited with at least 40 maneuver divisions and brigades which surpasses by an even greater margin the South Korean force structure of 21 divisions.⁵

From the Japanese perspective, what might be the impact of the above statements by Kim Il-sung and Jimmy Carter? Given the initial withdrawal of American ground combat troops and the reassessment of North Korean forces, what adjustments must Japan make if she should perceive the development of a security vacuum and a threat to her national security? As Japanese leaders analyze these series of events in North-east Asia, they may well observe with some apprehension what appears to be the changing nature of America's posture in Asia. With respect to the Nixon Doctrine and "shocks," and President Carter's troop withdrawal plan and pending treaty termination with the Republic of China (ROC), these American foreign policy developments may be viewed as indicators of the reduced United States role in this region. If, in fact, this is the Japanese perception and the withdrawal is perceived as destabilizing in light of Kim Il-sung's past behavior and bellicose rhetoric, what repercussions might this have on Japan?

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the United States withdrawal from the Republic of Korea on Japanese national security. The term withdrawal refers to the guidelines set down by the US government reflecting the general schedule for the reduction of American ground forces from 1978 through 1982.⁶ The references to Japan's national security will be treated in the context of pronouncements made by both the Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency of Japan. If

it is true that Japan perceives an increased threat to its national security because of the withdrawal, it would follow that she might attempt to modify her current national security strategy to take such an added threat into consideration. In this paper, I am going to examine the current status of Japan's national security structure, the changing role of the US in Asia, and Japan's perception of the threat in North-east Asia in an attempt to formulate probable options and strategies available to Japan as she assesses the impact of the US withdrawal from South Korea.

Background

Through the centuries, Asia has been a flashpoint of violence and instability. The Korean peninsula was often the focal point of this conflict. In Japan, since the attempted invasions of the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan from the peninsula in 1274 and 1281, Korea had been recognized as the "dagger pointed at the heart" of the Japanese islands. The Manchu invasion of Korea in 1627 did little to alleviate Japanese fears about a Chinese force making the 120 mile trek from the Asian mainland. By the end of the nineteenth century, an expansionist and somewhat strategically minded Japan first wrested Korea from the Chinese and then challenged Russia in 1902 for domination of the peninsula. Emerging victorious from the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan made Korea a protectorate and a buffer between her home islands and the traditional invasion routes from the Chinese mainland. Japan's control of the peninsula from 1905 until her defeat in 1945 provided her with a new sense of security.

With the end of World War II and the coming of the Cold War, the factors determining Japan's national security changed drastically. Externally, on the Korean peninsula, she first witnessed in 1945 the division of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel into two separate occupation zones. The north was to be administered by the Soviet Union and the south by the United States. Despite the fact that the demarcation line was to be temporary, extensive diplomatic efforts failed to unify Korea. Internally, Japan was stripped of her political, economic, and military foundations under the direction of America's occupation forces. Her future security concerns now became inextricably linked with United States interests in Asia. Under the direction and protection of America, Japan was free to rebuild her political and economic institutions leaving her associated military and national security considerations in the hands of the United States primarily in the form of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (Appendix A).

Consequently, the basis of this study is rooted in the vicissitudes of international politics which have permeated the Northeast Asian scene. The complexity of events involving the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Japan in conflict and compromise at various stages in three wars in the last 34 years, makes it imperative that such a study be undertaken. The very nature of Japan's political and geographic position in Asia with respect to the exigencies of current developments necessitates an examination capable of anticipating possible courses of action that may be available to Japan as she reacts to America's withdrawal from the Korean peninsula.

Survey of the literature

A comprehensive analysis of the United States movement of forces from South Korea and its impact on Japanese national security has not yet come to print. Because it is a matter of recent interest, the withdrawal decision and some of the consequences which have yet to come to fruition are still a matter of speculation. Public discussion has generally been limited to congressional committee hearings and academic conferences where primary emphasis has been given to the implications and/or advantages and disadvantages of the withdrawal on US interests rather than on its effect on Japan and specifically her national security concerns. This has imposed some limitations on this study and has made it necessary to tap a myriad of sources from various governmental agencies, academic circles, private institutions, personal papers, and interviews.

The subject of Japanese security and rearmament, however, has been treated extensively. That body of knowledge has served as a framework for this study. Finally, because of the recent series of diplomatic events, journals and magazines have become valuable sources as a means of keeping abreast with current developments.

CHAPTER 1

ENDNOTES

¹Kim Il-sung, For The Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, (New York: Guardian Associates, Inc., 1976), p. 24.

²Address to the Foreign Policy Association, June 23, 1976. See New York Times, June 24, 1976, p. 22.

³U.S. Department of State, "Korea and the United States--The Era Ahead," The Department of State Bulletin 79 (February 1979): 29.

⁴Stuart E. Johnson, The Military Equation in Northeast Asia, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 38. A more detailed clarification of the total North Korean-South Korean force structure is given in chapter four.

⁵Army Times, January 15, 1979, p. 3.

⁶CINCPAC Command Briefing, Honolulu, Hawaii, September 1978.

CHAPTER 2

JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY

Since 1945, Japanese national security has been rooted in the shared interests of Japanese-American relations. This relationship is multidimensional and, as a result of the postwar Occupation policies which served to demilitarize and democratize Japan, has become an integral part of United States interests in East Asia. Under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the Occupation forces followed the letter of the law stipulated in the initial postsurrender policy which was "to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the US or to the peace and security of the world."¹ While the demilitarization process included the total demobilization and disarmament of all Japanese military forces, the democratization program encompassed the complete political reform and economic rehabilitation of Japan as a nation. By 1947, the reform process was in full swing inculcating American ideals which affected the entire political, economic, military, and social fabric of the Japanese people. The accomplishment of this awesome task also brought with it the concomitant responsibility of the United States to provide, among other things, for the security of Japan. This was particularly important in light of what has become known as Japan's "Peace Constitution" whereby the Japanese in May, 1947, agreed to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes" and that "land, sea, and air forces, as well

as other war potential, will never be maintained."² This "renunciation of war" clause has been the legal guideline upon which postwar Japanese defense policy has been founded.

In 1957, Japan incorporated the "Basic Policies for National Defense" into her defense program which includes the following:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for country, thereby, establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in future in deterring and repelling such aggression.³

For the purpose of this study, I have examined three facets of Japan's national security which are related to the above principles. They need to be analyzed in order to fully understand the total concept and the probable impact of the United States ground troop withdrawal from South Korea on Japan's national security. These areas include (1) the identification of Japan's vital interests, (2) the status of Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF), and (3) the meaning of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty. The first area dealing with the analysis of Japan's vital interests is not designed to address the first two "basic policies." Both of these non-military features are covered throughout the text. In order to highlight what I felt was a key ingredient in Japan's national security structure, I have determined that an examination of Japan's vital interests at this juncture was important.

Vital Interests

What Japan envisions as important to her national survival can be categorized into two major divisions. First, are those interests directly concerned with insuring her economic growth. Second, are critical politico-military interests which allow her economic designs to develop peacefully. Both of these categories can be further subdivided into elements critical to Japan's national survival.

Economic Interests

1. Continuation of a favorable trade climate;
2. Maintenance of Japan's sea lines of communication; and
3. Access to scientific advances, energy resources, and raw materials.

Politico-Military Interests

1. Maintenance of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty;
2. World peace and stability;
3. Peace on the Korean peninsula;
4. Maintenance of a stable relationship within the Sino-Soviet sphere; and
5. Security and stability in Southeast Asia.

Stability is the key to all these factors and Japan's response to any development that might threaten that stability needs to be closely examined. Consideration would have to be given to her courses of action against potential antagonists (i.e., an invasion of South Korea by North Korea supported or unsupported by the People's Republic of China and/or the Soviet Union) seeking to disrupt the Japanese-South Korean relationship for example. This concern would also encompass the effect hostilities on the peninsula would have internationally in terms of calling into play military and economic alliances of non-Asian powers. The involvement of the United States, for instance, based on her security treaty

with the Republic of Korea could set off a chain reaction. This might include the use of Japanese territory for forward staging areas, an American confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR as potential supporters for the DPRK, and the support or non-support economically and militarily of selected Middle Eastern and Western European countries. The variables involved and possible conclusions are almost endless. The choices for Japan will not be easy but when the decisions are made and action is taken, Japanese vital interests will in one form or another be affected.

It is unequivocally clear that Japan must trade in order to survive. She depends on the continuation of a favorable trade climate more than any other industrialized nation in the world. The June 1973 soybean embargo followed by the oil embargo five months later are reminders of her vulnerability. Japan's dearth of natural resources and farmland renders her almost completely dependent on outside sources to feed (50 percent of her foodstuffs are imported), shelter, and clothe her 115,120,000 people.⁴ She is the biggest importer of raw materials (primarily iron ore, coal, and nonferrous metallic ores) and the single largest recipient by percentage of oil (importing 99.7 percent) in the world.⁵

This dependency on the outside world is further complicated by the lengthy sea lines of communication over which some 2,000 ships bound for Japan monthly carrying critical resources must travel.⁶ Her major suppliers of raw materials include the Persian Gulf nations, Australia, and the United States. The tanker voyage from the Mideast to Japan, for example, is 6,550 miles or a travel time of 38 days. From Australia and

the United States, the distance to be covered is 5,062 and 4,536 miles, respectively.⁷ Another potential problem lies in the sea approaches to Japan. Over 90 percent of her oil imports must pass through several narrow chokepoints which could easily be blocked by even a weak hostile power. The Malacca, Sundra, and Lombok Straits, for example, are among the critical passageways in Southeast Asia over which Japan has no control.

Other economic-related interests include Japan's desire to import the latest scientific advances as a means of maintaining and improving her technological posture. The development of nuclear and solar energy projects and the acquisition of recent improvements in computer technology are prominent examples.⁸ Japan needs to trade in order to survive and ready access to and availability of energy resources and raw materials is imperative if she expects to maintain the world's third largest gross national product. This vital element of her economic environment requires continuous freedom of action in import-export negotiations as a means of sustaining her economic momentum.

Although Japan's politico-military interests appear secondary, they are equally vital to her national survival. The United States-Japanese security treaty has provided a security umbrella under which Japan has been able to function and prosper without devoting large expenditures for defense. It has also obviated the need for Japan to become directly involved in the series of regional and global conflicts since the postwar period. However, Japan's involvement in the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Court, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade as well as her membership

in some twelve regional organizations throughout Asia have served notice of her concern to keep the balance of international order on an even keel.⁹ It is less of an altruistic approach as it is an insurance guide wherein world stability guarantees the continuous and uninterrupted flow of commerce which has contributed to Japan's economic success. As former Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa said in a speech before the Trilateral Commission in January 1977:

Any turmoil and conflict at the farthest corners of the world may at once seriously affect our shore. The maintenance of peace and stability in the world is a prerequisite for our existence.¹⁰

The historical importance of Korea to Japanese security has been noted. Pronouncements in terms of the Nixon-Sato 1969 and the Ford-Miki 1975 communiqués have re-emphasized South Korea's security as "essential" to Japan. The outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula would jeopardize the trilateral relationship between the US, the PRC, and the USSR and would no doubt involve Japan, because of her connection with these three great powers, in a quagmire of events which may prove to be both harmful and irreversible. Japan has, since 1950, provided the United States with forward basing facilities and because of the latter's military alliance with the ROK, Japan could very well be forced, in one form or another, into a confrontation with the PRC, the USSR, and the DPRK. On the other hand, Japanese-American relations could be severely tested by Japan's non-support of America in South Korea in terms of using Japanese territory as a staging and operational base. This would limit the capability of the United States to conduct sustained operations in the ROK and in turn jeopardize America's ability to effectively fulfill her treaty commitment with South Korea as well as her credibility with

her allies. Strong support of the United States, however, could bring the already weakened ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) into a domestic confrontation with the Japanese Left. The ramifications of this internal strife would be unsettling and costly to both the United States and Japan as they attempt to deal with a crisis on the Korean peninsula.

A second major Japanese objective is to have South Korea controlled by a government favorably disposed to Japan. Presupposing the takeover of South Korea by North Korea, several disturbing features become apparent. First, the process would involve violence and the maintenance of a communist Korean government would require force and repression. Geopolitically, Japan would lose the buffer which now exists between her islands and the peninsula in terms of a South Korean armed force of 642,000 men and some 35,940,000 citizens.¹¹ Additionally, Japan would be faced with a shorter warning time from a communist air attack launched from the tip of the Korean peninsula as well as encounter a greater number of enemy fighters with the capability of remaining on station for a longer period of time.¹² Internally, Japan could possibly face a renewed mobilization, sabotage, and subversion from its Korean minority, two-thirds of whom are affiliated with the General Federation of Korean Residents, a pro-DPRK organization. Internationally, a communist takeover would further force Japan to reassess her relationship with the PRC and the USSR possibly resulting in unwanted or unplanned for compromises.

A final point of interest with respect to peace in Korea centers on Japan's desire to maintain and derive economic and political advantages from both North and South Korea. The favorable trade climate which

Japan enjoys with South Korea represents approximately four percent of Japan's world trade.¹³ In 1974, Japan's export trade to South Korea was valued at \$2.6 billion while imports from the ROK amounted to \$1.5 billion.¹⁴ Next to Indonesia (mainly because of her bauxite, timber and oil imports), South Korea ranks second in Asian trade with Japan. The direct investment market for Japan in South Korea is a little over ten percent of Japan's world wide investments or a total of \$690 million in total equity investments.¹⁵ This does not include the capital assets of some 40 Japanese firms in South Korea.¹⁶ In terms of aid and credits, the ROK is number two in priority receiving from 18 to 24 percent of Japan's development aid. Despite the fact that these trade figures with South Korea may appear to be miniscule and not extremely vital to Japanese interests, the broader implications jeopardizing this relationship as discussed earlier must be taken into account.

With respect to North Korea, preliminary steps towards a Pyongyang-Tokyo rapprochement began in mid-1971 and have since increased to include the less restricted movement of people between Japan and North Korea and an exchange between the Liberal Democratic Party and North Korean representatives. In the economic sector, there has also been an increase in business negotiations resulting in trade agreements and credit programs. North Korea now receives 20 percent of her imports from Japan and Tokyo today is the North's largest non-communist trading partner.¹⁷ The quantity of these exchange visits and new trade relationships are particularly important in the context of the quality of communication which has opened and the dialogue established as another means of easing tensions and insuring stability on the Korean peninsula.

The present Sino-Soviet conflict benefits Japan's national security posture. The rift has allowed Japan to engage in an "equidistant" relationship with both communist powers, deriving in the process economic and diplomatic advantages. Any worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute could upset the global and regional stability and consequently not be in the interests of Japanese security. This is particularly true with respect to the situation in Southeast Asia and the existing tensions between North and South Korea. On the other hand, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement could present a more unified communist front in Asia. For Kim Il-sung, this might mean a greater support base for his invasion plans to the south. On a global scale, the lessening of the Sino-Soviet conflict could free both countries from their preoccupation of stationing troops on their common border to a repositioning of forces in a posture threatening to both Japan and the United States. The Soviets massing of these additional troops, for example, in Western Europe and a United States response to meet this added threat with forces from Asia might create a security vacuum which Japan presently does not have the means to fill.¹⁸

The maintenance of a stable operating atmosphere in Southeast Asia is another vital interest for Japan. This concern for peace and stability in this region is based on economic, political, and strategic considerations. Southeast Asia is Japan's second largest trading partner and of "special interest" to the Japanese people. It is no wonder that the Japanese view of the economic-politico-strategic triad in Southeast Asia has often warranted the comment that "If Northeast Asia is a 'military-security' key point for Japan, it can be said that Southeast

Asia is a major axis for the 'economic security' of Japan."¹⁹ To insure the maintenance of peace in this area, Japan has undertaken programs of economic development, direct foreign investment, credits and loans (Japan is the largest aid donor in Asia) in addition to her role in the Asian Development Conference. It is anticipated that her involvement would contribute to Southeast Asia's economic and internal political stability as well as serve to keep Japan's maritime lifelines from the Persian Gulf through critical Southeast Asian chokepoints open and act as a temporary hedge against a potential threat from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), mainland China, or the Soviet Union. In view of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese incursion into Vietnam, and the threatening posture of the USSR in support of the SRV, Japanese interests in Southeast Asia are even more significant and will require delicate diplomatic handling.

All of these interests are crucial for Japan. The fact that the United States ground force withdrawal may be viewed as de-stabilizing increases the concern for the future maintenance and preservation of these interests. It also brings into question the changing nature of America's posture in Asia and Japan's view of what might appear to be a shifting balance of power. In this context, it renews the debate on the status of another vital element in Japan's security structure, the Japanese Self-Defense Force.

Self-Defense Forces

The evolution of Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) began at the end of World War II. Article 9 of Japan's constitution placed severe restrictions on the type of security forces which Japan could maintain.

The Cold War turmoil between the United States and the Soviet Union followed by the Communist Chinese takeover in October 1949 on the China mainland, led to an American assessment of her security interests in East Asia. America's preoccupation on both the European and Asian front prompted the Truman administration to restructure its reform program in Japan. The task now was to redirect General MacArthur's rehabilitative policies, to set a "reverse course," with the intent of rebuilding Japan and making her "the very linchpin of American Far Eastern Strategy."²⁰

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, created a security vacuum in Japan when General MacArthur was ordered to send his Occupation troops to confront the threat in Korea. Japan at this crucial point suffered from a series of riots and strikes by left-wing radicals and members from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). In order to counter this danger, General MacArthur on July 8, 1950 authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve (NPR) consisting of 75,000 men. By July 1952, the NPR was redesignated as the National Safety Agency with a total strength of 108,700 men. Two years later, the National Defense Agency was created and the present Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) were formally brought into existence (Appendix B).

Today's SDF ranks seventh in the world in terms of defense expenditures.²¹ However, the ratio of Japan's defense budget (\$8.57 billion) in fiscal year 1978 to her gross national product was only 0.9 percent.²² Because of constitutional constraints, the present tactical configuration of the SDF is in the defensive mode.²³ The chart below depicts Japan's overall personnel strength and defense expenditures in comparison with other East Asian countries.

	<u>Total</u> <u>Armed Forces</u>	<u>Defense</u> <u>Expenditures</u> (billions \$)
China	4,325,000	35
Soviet Union	3,638,000	130
US	2,068,800	115.2
ROK	642,000	2.6
DPRK	512,000	1.03
ROC	474,000	1.67
Japan	240,000	8.57

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1978-1979, pp. 5, 8, 56, 62 and 64.

(Figure 2-1. Japan and East Asian Armed Forces
and Defense Expenditures)

Japan's force structure (Appendix C) is the product of a series of Defense Buildup Plans (DBP). The first DBP (1958-1961) was designed to cope with the reduction of United States forces in Japan and to refurbish the MSDF and the ASDF.²⁴

The second DBP (1962-1966) provided for a tremendous qualitative buildup of SDF equipment.²⁵ This included the replacement of obsolete American equipment and the introduction of modern air force components.

The third DBP (1967-1972), at a total cost of \$6.5 billion, consisted of qualitative and quantitative improvements.²⁶ It included provisions for the procurement of additional weapons systems so that Japan would have the capability of defending herself in a conventional conflict for at least a 30-day period. Of significance was the fact that a portion of these weapons would originate from domestic defense industries.

The fourth DBP (1972-1976) emphasized the modernization of equipment, increased firepower and mobility with no real change in personnel strength. The GSDF's mobility was enhanced with more sophisticated

helicopters, tanks, and armored cars. The reversion of Okinawa in 1972 paved the way for the MSDF's bid for increased ship tonnage (from 140,000 to 240,000 tons) and the addition of destroyers, destroyer escorts, submarines, torpedo boats, and helicopters.²⁷ The ASDF likewise began its initial replacement of transport, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft.

The fifth DBP (1977-1981) is presently designed to provide for a substantial increase in the MSDF.²⁸ These measures are being taken as partial steps to insure the protection of Japan's seaborne interests in East and Southeast Asia. Her naval exercises in Hawaii and the Malacca Straits are indicative of the importance Japan places on her maritime interests.

Planners for the sixth DBP (1982-1986) are predicting even larger expenditures and the introduction of more sophisticated weapons and equipment which may very well transcend that fine line between defensive and offensive capability. There have been others bold enough to forecast the breakthrough of limited nuclear weapons research and experimentation for land-based and naval anti-ballistic missiles despite the domestic constraints to this course of action.

This digest of Japan's defense system illustrates some of the capabilities of her armed forces. Despite its rather modest size, the SDF is well organized and capable of dealing with an internal security threat for which it was originally established. It does not have, however, the power to engage in a protracted conflict against an outside threat. As one noted Japanese commentator on military affairs observed:

In the event the Soviet Union were to attack Japan tomorrow, Japan's air-defense system . . . would be wiped out in about 10 minutes, Japan's maritime fighting force would not last more than two or three days and Japan's ground force capabilities would come to an end in three or four days.²⁹

The efficiency of the SDF is further compromised by legal and psychological constraints. Among these are the inherent restrictions posed by the Japanese constitution, the bitter memories of prewar militarism, and the adoption of the three non-nuclear principles (not to manufacture, possess, or permit entry of nuclear weapons in Japan). As a result of these constraints, a number of SDF limitations can be identified.

First, in the command and control area, Japan does not have an operational plan covering all three branches of service and will not establish a Central Command Center until 1982.³⁰ In addition, she has not yet been exposed to major joint maneuvers with the United States nor has she engaged in defense consultations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³¹ These fundamental elements are vital factors which the JSDF needs to experience in order to be viable and credible as Japan's home defense guardian.

Second, Japan's totally defensive policy has restricted her from selling arms to other countries or deploying her forces in United Nations peacekeeping roles overseas. More importantly, it has prohibited conscription and, without replacement personnel and a mobilization capability, Japan cannot sustain herself in a protracted conflict.

Third, in terms of defense spending, the fifth DBP in fiscal year 1978, for example, appropriated 54.5 percent of its funds for personnel expenses and only 17.1 percent for military hardware as compared to the United States, France, and Britain which allocated 37.8 percent, 42 percent, and 42.1 percent respectively for military hardware. The same holds true in the area of research and development where Japan allotted 0.9 percent for fiscal year 1978 while the other three Western nations

contributed 9 percent, 17.1 percent, and 11.3 percent respectively.³² This feature alone has contributed to the out-of-date status of a number of weapons systems.

Fourth, in terms of military hardware and weapons systems, one of the more prominent deficiencies is Japan's air defense network. It encompasses the electronic Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system (whose sites are on hilltops and are not hardened), the F-105 fighter-interceptors (whose air bases are not hardened), the Nike-Hercules missiles, and anti-aircraft battery locations. The vulnerability of Japan's air defense system was made clear on September 6, 1976 when Lt. Victor Belenko, a Soviet air force defector, in a MIG-25 slipped through Japan's radar net and landed at Hakodate, Japan just 500 miles from Vladivostok. When the MIG-25 had been detected 200 miles off Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan, two F-4EJ fighters from the JASDF were scrambled, but within fifteen minutes the Soviet aircraft had crossed into Japanese territory and disappeared from the BADGE system. Before the JASDF interceptors could ever locate the MIG-25, Lt. Belenko had already landed on Japanese soil.³³ Unless the BADGE system and its vectoring capability are updated, Japan's plan to acquire the sophisticated F-15's will not improve appreciably Japan's air defense network.³⁴

A major deficiency for the GSDF is the fact that it is small and continuously falls short of filling its authorized strength levels. In 1978, for example, it was at 85.2 percent of its authorized level with many of the divisional units at only 70 percent strength.³⁵ Some of their equipment is outdated and the logistical system is inadequate to support the transportation of petroleum and other military supplies in the event that an attack north of Japan were initiated.³⁶

One of the limiting factors of Japan's MSDF is the fact that her anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces cannot deter the Soviet and/or PRC submarine threat without United States assistance.³⁷ Apparently, too much emphasis has been placed on building expensive frigates and destroyers for ASW when those efforts might have been channelled toward the construction of cheaper attack submarines which could also serve as mobile and secure platforms for launching missiles.³⁸ Additionally, Japan lacks patrol aircraft with precision anti-submarine missiles and small aircraft carriers to enhance her defense posture. These deficiencies are further compounded by the fact that Japan does not have the capacity to maintain her weapons system in a protracted conflict and has not availed herself of the opportunity to launch a reconnaissance satellite.³⁹

Finally, certain psychological and historical aspects impacting on the readiness of Japan's defense posture are evident:

- a. The Japanese have never fought on their own soil;
- b. The Japanese homeland has never been exposed to guerrilla warfare or external infiltrators;
- c. There is no popular support for forward defense in Japan;
- d. There are limited emergency stockpiles (oil, food, medical supplies);
- e. No public shelters or emergency laws have been established; and
- f. Restrictions on the SDF operational maneuvers, the failure to breach the one percent GNP ceiling for defense expenditures, limits on the use of military bases, training areas, transporting arms and ammunition, and restrictions on air space utilization have stymied the training and readiness of the SDF.⁴⁰

Given these limitations, Japan defense analysts still believe they can thwart a series of probing attacks, infiltration, and manage their internal security.⁴¹ However true this might be, fortunately for Japan, the fundamental variable in this unbalanced equation of her defense-orientated posture and the cornerstone of her defense policy is the United States-Japanese Security Treaty.

United States-Japanese Security Treaty

On the morning of September 8, 1951 at the Presidio of San Francisco, Japan signed the Treaty of Peace with its World War II enemies. That afternoon, the United States and Japan entered into a security treaty. It was, in effect, a politico-military agreement which followed in the wake of the USSR-PRC Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. It further served notice during the height of the Korean War of America's intent to use its forces to meet military threats to Japan in that region. The essence of that treaty was embodied in the preamble which states:

The United States . . . is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression . . .⁴²

The biggest disappointment for the United States in the 1950's was Japan's refusal to build what was perceived to be a force large enough to protect herself "against direct and indirect aggression." In addition, the treaty did not meet the expectations of either party as it failed to explicitly guarantee the defense of Japan and provided the United States with little more than base leasing rights and troop stationing provisions.

The unsatisfactory nature of the treaty prompted both sides to seek a revision and in 1960 the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed (Appendix A). The new agreement stipulated that "the Parties will consult together . . . whenever the security and peace of Japan . . . in the Far East is threatened." The importance of this clause is evident with respect to the "First Exchange of Notes" which state:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment . . . use of facilities . . . for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan . . . should be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.⁴³

The purpose of "prior consultation" was twofold. First, it allowed the Japanese a greater participatory role in the conduct of security affairs in Asia and second, it required the United States to seek Japanese approval before American bases on Japanese territory could be used as staging areas for combat operations outside Japan.

The fifth article of this agreement was structured primarily as a deterrent to the Soviet Union and has served in Japanese eyes as their "nuclear umbrella." Unlike past treaties and agreements, this clause acknowledges specifically America's intent to come to the defense of Japan without a corresponding obligation militarily on Japan's part.

One of the more controversial provisions of this treaty is Article 6 which grants America's armed forces the use of airfields, depots, ports, and other military facilities in Japan "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East."⁴⁴ The geographic implications of the "Far East" clause was a major concern to those who were opposed to the United States using bases on Japanese soil as staging areas for the

projection of America's power throughout Asia. Nonetheless, the bases are there and continue to service primarily the Seventh Fleet. Okinawa, because of its geographic proximity, has provided the type of staging area required of quick reaction forces to the Asian mainland and locations throughout the Western Pacific whenever needed.

The signatories of this agreement also agreed to a fixed expiration date wherein after ten years either party could "give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given."⁴⁵

Today, after nearly nineteen years, the treaty is still considered to be the cornerstone of the United States-Japanese alliance and supported favorably by 63 percent of the Japanese citizens.⁴⁶ There are, however, any number of circumstances which could threaten the utility of this treaty. First, Japanese political forces could call for the revision of the treaty's Far East clause. With the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement, certain Japanese may believe that the lessening of tensions in Asia makes the Far East clause unnecessary. They hold that all that is required is the presence of American forces in and around Japan to insure her security rather than Asia as a whole. Second, change could come about through an American initiative to encourage Japan to contribute more to her defensive role. Japan's position as an economic giant and military midget might well prompt the United States to urge Japan to spend more for their defense needs and to play a greater contributing role in the United States-Japanese alliance. The United States-West German relationship might be used as a case in point.

CHAPTER 2

ENDNOTES

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¹¹International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: Bartholomew Press, 1978), p. 64.

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¹⁸Soviet forces east of the Ural Mountains in Asia are estimated at 650,000 troops which include 25 percent of her airpower and one of four fleets in the Pacific. See Sheldon W. Simon, "Japan's Foreign Policy: Adjustments to a Changing Environment," Asian Survey 18 (July 1978): 668. According to Admiral Stansfield Turner, CIA Director, "From 1969 to 1978 Soviet troops in East Europe rose to 13 percent compared to a 63 percent increase along the Sino-Soviet border." Army Times, February 12, 1979, p. 40.

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²²IISS, The Military Balance 1978-1979, p., 89. Of the 63 countries listed, Japan's 0.9 percent of her GNP for defense is the second lowest with Mexico last at 0.6 percent.

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³⁷David Shilling, "A Reassessment of Japan's Naval Defense Needs," Asian Survey 16 (March 1976): 217.

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CHAPTER 3

THE CHANGING AMERICAN POSTURE

Japan's Mutual Security Treaty with the United States is the keystone of her national security and defense posture. It represents to Japan "an important pillar of the fundamental framework of international politics in Asia and contributes to the peace and stability of Asia and the entire world."¹ The question today, however, is how dependable is the United States-Japanese security alliance? Despite America's reassurances to honor her commitments, how credible is her resolve to meet this critical security obligation? In a 1974 Japanese public opinion poll, 34 percent of the respondents believed that the United States would not come to the defense of Japan under the treaty. Four years later the percentage of negative respondents rose to 52 percent.² Does the United States withdrawal of ground troops from South Korea represent the continuing saga of America's "neo-isolationism" and the relegating of what once was a "vital" interest to a "minor one"? These and other questions concerning the United States posture and intent in Asia have created an air of uncertainty regarding the balance of power in this region. As the Japanese look back over the years at what might appear to be an American retrenchment in Asia, a series of events have given rise to their increased security interests.

The Nixon Doctrine

In spite of American reassurances to honor her treaty commitment to Japan, prominent events of the past have led some to believe otherwise.

The Nixon Doctrine is probably the most pronounced manifestation of America's position in Asia. The first indication of a change in policy came in 1967 when Mr. Nixon wrote:

. . . it is not realistic to expect a nation . . . to be totally dependent for its security on another nation . . . there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress could now support a unilateral intervention at the request of the host government.³

On July 25, 1969, at a plane-side news conference on Guam, President Nixon elaborated:

If the USA just continued on the road of responding to requests for assistance, of assuming the primary responsibility for defending these countries when they had internal or external problems, they were never going to take care of themselves.⁴

Three days later in Bangkok, as he continued his Asian tour, he added:

The challenge to our wisdom is to support the Asian countries' efforts to defend and develop themselves, without attempting to take from them the responsibilities which should be theirs.⁵

These pronouncements, first referred to as the Guam Doctrine, were departures from the policy of previous administrations. In their rudimentary form, they served notice that the United States government intended to relinquish its role as the "policeman" of, at least, Asia, charging her allies to assume a much greater responsibility for their own defense.

In his November 3, 1969, "Address to the Nation of US Policy on the War in Vietnam," President Nixon restated three fundamental aspects of his Guam Doctrine:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.⁶

On February 18, 1970, in his message to Congress on the "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's," President Nixon formally bestowed the title of "Nixon Doctrine" on his new policy when he proclaimed:

This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam--the "Nixon Doctrine." Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot --- and will not --- conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.⁷

At this stage, these general guidelines gave no hint of how the policy would be applied and what "interests" would make the "real difference."

The American withdrawal from Asia had raised many questions as to what degree and how fast would this be accomplished. The largest reduction in forces came between 1969 and 1971. During this period, the breakdown of the United States withdrawal was as follows:⁸

Vietnam	260,000	Japan	12,000
Korea	20,000	Philippines	9,000
Thailand	16,000	Okinawa	5,000

This included the pullout of the 7th Infantry Division from South Korea and the transfer of the 2d Infantry Division from the frontline on the demilitarized zone to a strategic reserve role north of Seoul. The purpose of repositioning the 2d Infantry Division was to insure that American troops would not be drawn into combat unnecessarily in the event of a minor skirmish. It could also suggest, however, that the desire to

avoid involvement might signify a reluctance to use American ground forces when needed in a timely manner.⁹

The current status of American troops in the Pacific as of January 1978 is depicted in Figure 3-1. The United States presently has only

JAPAN

1 Airlift Squadron

OKINAWA

2/3 Marine Division
1 Air Wing
4 Fighter Squadrons (F4)

KOREA

1 Infantry Division (-)
1 Air Def Arty Bde
1 Missile Command
3 Fighter Squadrons (F4)

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1,100 US Troops

PHILIPPINES

2 Fighter Squadrons
1 Airlift Squadron

WESTERN PACIFIC

2 A/C Carrier TF's
2 Amphib Landing Groups
4 Anti-Sub Plane Squadrons
35 Anti-Sub

HAWAII

1 Army Division
1/3 Marine Div & Air Wing

CALIFORNIA

1 Marine Div & Air Wing

EASTERN PACIFIC

4 A/C Carrier TF's
4 Amphib Landing Groups
4 Anti-Sub Plane Squadrons

GUAM

1 B52 Bomber Squadron
10 Polaris Missile Submarines

Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea, January 1978, p. 38.

(Figure 3-1. U.S. Forces Deployed in the Pacific)

one-half of her navy and 12 percent of army and air force stationed in Asia.¹⁰ The reduced numerical strength of the Seventh Fleet, its 8,000 mile coverage from the Sea of Japan to the Indian Ocean (to include its immense logistical tail), and its reliance on allied bases and ports,

which may not be available because of political, economic, or military reasons, appears to render the navy's over-committed Pacific contingent vulnerable and a somewhat less formidable force during an Asian crisis.¹¹

The Nixon Shocks - Pearl Harbor in Reverse?

The "Nixon shocks" of 1971 did little to restore Japan's faith in America's intentions and reliability despite repeated assurances from administration officials. The first "Nixon shokku," as the Japanese referred to them, came on July 15, 1971, when President Nixon announced his intended visit to Peking. The failure of the United States government to consult Japan on this momentous decision was contrary to the US-Japanese China policy where each agreed during the Nixon-Sato summit meeting in November 1969 that "the two governments should maintain close contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East including Japan."¹² This new unilateral approach served notice to the Japanese that the United States was willing to embark on a separate course when it served her own interests. The secrecy of the negotiations with China also implied a lack of confidence in Japan and cast doubts on the American-Japanese relationship of "special trust" and particularly America's apparent willingness to sacrifice her Japanese friendship for what had previously been a common adversary, the People's Republic of China. The fact that the United States had previously advised Japan against forming a closer relationship with the PRC only further rankled Japanese sensibilities. This failure to consult Japan reinforced Japanese doubts regarding America's credibility, cast a shadow

on the United States-Japanese relationship, and reminded Japan that their special bond with the United States could not be taken for granted.

A month later, the second "Nixon shock" hit Japan when the United States announced on August 15, 1971, a ten percent surcharge on imports. Not specifically aimed at Japan, the intent of the surcharge was ostensibly directed at the revaluation of the yen.¹³

On January 6, 1972, a second Nixon-Sato meeting was held in San Clemente. The intent was to restore the apparent loss of trust and confidence which had occurred since the last summit meeting. How much of that special relationship was re-established is open to debate since the China question remained unresolved. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato later announced his displeasure when he stated:

I have not been able to trust fully the United States since the sudden announcement of the President's plan to visit China and its dollar defense measures that included the 10 percent import surcharge in spite of its promises to keep commitments to old friends.¹⁴

In February 1972, President Nixon made his historic sojourn to the PRC, leaving to Dr. Kissinger in his visit to Tokyo in June of that year the unenviable task of attempting to clear up the "misunderstanding" of United States-Japanese relations over the past two years. The effort to reassure Japan of America's sincerity in their common interests was repeated in August 1972 when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and President Nixon met at Kuilima, Hawaii. The public result was a joint communiqué announcing agreements on general security, cultural, and economic issues.¹⁵ Unofficially, an understanding was reached whereby each country would be able to conduct independent negotiations with the PRC.¹⁶

America's inability to win in Vietnam and spring 1975 withdrawal set the stage for continuing the debate with respect to the United States resolve in a protracted conflict. The nature of her national will and strength of her international backbone were once again brought into question. Statements like "no more Vietnams" and "no United States involvement in another Asian land war" did nothing to alleviate the fears of America's most ardent allies.

President Ford's historic visit to Japan in November 1974, the first by an American President, was another in a series of steps to rekindle the fire of the special relationship between the United States and Japan. It was followed by Prime Minister Takeo Miki's visit to America in August 1975 and later Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako's visit in October of the same year. These were major steps to once again reassure Japan of America's credibility but did not diffuse the tenor set by the "Nixon shocks." The "shocks," if anything, prompted Japan to pursue a more independent course of action in her foreign relations free from the dictates of the United States. Her stance in November 1973 with respect to the Mideast issue following the oil embargo is a prime example.¹⁷

Carter's Troop Withdrawal/Treaty Termination

President Jimmy Carter's ground troop withdrawal plan from Korea represents another in the series of events which seemed to undermine America's intent to play a dominant role in Asia. In view of his 1976 campaign pledge to withdraw troops from South Korea, the announcement itself should not have come as a total surprise. What did come as a shock was the failure once again of an American administration to consult

its allies in advance. For Japan, confidence in the United States again dropped. American combat troops on the Korean peninsula had been considered a stabilizing force in East Asia and tangible proof of America's commitment in this critical region. The opportunity to position troops forward on the peninsula permitted the United States to project her strength and manifest herself as an Asian power not by geography, but by virtue of her presence as a viable deterrent. When Vice-President Walter F. Mondale was sent to Japan to assuage Japanese fears in February 1977, the message to the Japanese was not one of a "consultative" nature but merely to "inform" them, fait accompli, that the withdrawal would take place on a graduated scale from 1978 through 1982. By the end of 1978, 2,600 noncombat personnel and one maneuver battalion from the 2d Infantry Division had been redeployed back to the United States.¹⁸

The visible presence of American ground troops on the Korean peninsula remains as firm evidence of America's intent to fulfill her treaty commitment. The withdrawal of these forces would not lessen the obligatory aspect of the United States-Republic of Korea Treaty but would certainly leave Japan and South Korea with grave doubts concerning the reliability of the United States to return ground forces to the Korean peninsula if South Korea were threatened or attacked.¹⁹ Despite American assurances of maintaining air and naval elements in and around South Korea, the deterrent value of these forces by themselves is questionable. As one Japanese newsman noted: "Ships and airplanes are very nice, but it is land forces in position north of Seoul, that convey your true intentions."²⁰ Military assistance plans currently call for providing South Korea with \$1.9 billion in credits and grant military aid

for the four year withdrawal period. The fact that this will also include the transfer of \$800 million worth of United States military equipment has not caused the Japanese to share America's optimism and confidence over South Korea's effectiveness and capability to defend herself on the Korean peninsula.²¹

With respect to President Carter's plan to terminate the United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, observers can only wonder about the reverberations such an action will have among America's allies. For the first time, the United States intends to cancel a security treaty with an ally. Japan and South Korea, among others, have similar treaties with the United States. Speculation may well be heightened on the utility of these commitments in an era of American foreign policy which seems to be characterized by a "shoot-from-the-hip" diplomacy. Many Asians may share the sentiments of William C. H. Shen, the last Republic of China ambassador to the United States, who lamented that:

The feeling will be different. The American government has forsaken us, has cast us adrift . . . in favor of establishing relations with a communist regime. People back home . . . believe that they can no longer rely on the United States of America No consultation, no sufficient notification --- so the basis for confidence has been destroyed.²²

The compilation of the above factors (Nixon Doctrine and shocks, force reductions, Vietnam defeat, Carter's withdrawal from Korea and pending treaty termination with the ROC) coupled with a new generation of Americans below the age of thirty only vaguely familiar with the Korean War and more concerned with domestic issues rather than foreign involvement, have given Japanese viewers cause for concern with reference to the changing posture of the United States in Asia. The erosion of American

credibility, retrenchment, neo-isolationism, paralysis of will, island-chain strategy, and the viability of treaty commitments are common terms continuously employed and weighed against pronouncements and assurances that America will continue to stand by her allies. The intent here, however, has not been to portray the complete abandonment of American interests in Asia but to cite specific indicators of the last decade which may cause Japan to perceive a security vacuum in this vital region, particularly in Korea. Although American interests in Asia and the Western Pacific are many and still important, what the United States has said and is doing with respect to South Korea and the Republic of China may cause Japan to view with some apprehension what might appear to be the transformation of a new balance of power which could adversely affect her national security and defense posture.

CHAPTER 3

ENDNOTES

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⁵Ibid.

⁶U.S., Department of State, "The Pursuit of Peace in Vietnam," by Richard M. Nixon The Department of State Bulletin 61 (November 24, 1969): 440.

⁷U.S. President, Public Paper of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1971), Richard M. Nixon, 1970, p. 118.

⁸Leslie H. Brown, "American Security Policy in Asia," Adelphi Papers No. 132 (London: IISS, 1977), 6.

⁹William Beecher, "Changing the Guard in Korea," Army 21 (January 1971): 21-22.

¹⁰U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, pp. 28 and 38.

¹¹Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Worth H. Bagley, "Strategic Deterioration in the Pacific: The Dilemma for the U.S. and Japan," Pacific Community 9 (January 1978): 118. With respect to US bases in the Philippines, on December 31, 1978 an agreement between the US and the Philippines was reached wherein the latter would retain sovereignty over the bases under the command of a Filipino commander. The size of United States bases was also reduced. Christian Science Monitor, January 2, 1979, p. 2. See also Gordon, "Japan, the United States, and Southeast Asia," pp. 592-593.

¹²Kunio Muraoka, "Japan Security and the United States," Adelphi Papers No. 95 (February 1973), 1.

13J. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy (New York: Norton and Co., 1975), p. 218.

14John M. Lee, "Nixon-Sato Talks Disappoint Japan," New York Times, January 16, 1972, p. 8.

15Text of Joint Statement, "President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Meet in Hawaii," Department of State Bulletin 67 (September 25, 1972): 331-333.

16Marshall Green, "Mutual Trust and Security in US-Japan Relations," Department of State Bulletin 72 (December 18, 1972): 706.

17Susan Hattis Rolef, "The Changing Circumstances of Japan's Foreign Policy," Asian Survey 16 (November 1976): 1041.

18U.S., Department of State, "East Asia: U.S. Combat Forces in South Korea," The Department of State Bulletin 78 (June 1978): 36.

19This assurance was once again related to President Park from President Carter when the latter stated: "I wish to emphasize strongly that our ground-force withdrawal plans signify no change whatsoever in our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. The mutual defense treaty between our two countries remains fully in force . . . neither North Korea nor any other country should have any doubts about the continuing strength of this commitment." See Strategic Survey 1977 (London: Bartholomew Press, 1978), p. 90.

20William V. Kennedy, "The Future of US Military Commitments to Japan and Korea." (Military issues research memorandum, US Army War College, Pennsylvania, August 25, 1976), p. 9.

21U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, p. 3.

22James N. Wallace, "China: Really a Bonanza For U.S. Business?" U.S. News and World Report, January 8, 1979, p. 18.

CHAPTER 4

JAPANESE PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT

The Japanese concern for peace and stability in Asia must take into consideration the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC and how their interests complement, conflict with, or threaten Japan's national security and defense posture. This is particularly important today in Northeast Asia where the commonality of these interests had once before come into conflict on the Korean peninsula. The conclusions Japan draws as she surveys the intent of these countries will serve as a basis for her perception of the threat and policy decisions. A summation highlighting some of the more prominent complementary and conflicting interests of the major actors in East Asia with Japan might be depicted as follows:

Japan/United States

A. Complementary interests:

1. Maintaining regional stability;
2. Maintaining political, economic, and defense ties in the region;
3. Keeping Japan economically viable;
4. Maintaining US influence in Northeast Asia;
5. Reducing Soviet influence in Northeast Asia;
6. Keeping the sea lines of communication to and from Japan open;
7. Maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula and insuring that Korea does not come under the control of a hostile government.

B. Conflicting interests:

1. "Protectionist" policy on Japanese imports;
2. The 200-mile limit of US coastlines.
3. US Mideast policies;
4. Economic competition in international markets.

Japan/Soviet Union

A. Complementary interests: Maintaining economic developmental, and trade links (Trans-Siberian project and offshore exploration).

B. Conflicting interests:

1. Northern territories dispute and military activities in that sector;
2. Growing Soviet presence in Northeast Asia;
3. Normalization of relations with the PRC;
4. Fisheries issue;
5. Pace of Japanese rearmament.

Japan/People's Republic of China

A. Complementary interests:

1. Maintaining diplomatic and economic links;
2. Maintaining regional stability;
3. Reducing Soviet influence in Northeast Asia;
4. Insuring adequate US presence in Asia to counter USSR initiatives.

B. Conflicting interests:

1. Regarding favorable relations with the USSR in trade, economics, and developmental projects;
2. Involving excessive (in PRC view) Japanese rearmament;

3. Regarding the Japan-Republic of Korea Continental Development Pact;

4. Involving the possession of Senkaku oil reserves.

Japan/Republic of Korea

A. Complementary interests:

1. Maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula and insuring that Korea does not come under the control of a hostile government;
2. Maintaining US political, economic, defense ties;
3. Insuring regional stability;
4. Maintaining the growth of economic and developmental programs;
5. Maintaining sea lines of communication in Northeast Asia;
6. Reducing Soviet influence.

B. Conflicting interests:

1. Involving the fisheries issues;
2. Control of Takeshima Islands in the Sea of Japan.

Japan/North Korea

A. Complementary interests:

1. Maintaining cultural lines of communication and exchange visits;
2. Providing loan credits for developmental projects.

B. Conflicting interests:

1. Involving the DPRK's desire to control the Korean peninsula;
2. Maintaining regional stability on the Korean peninsula;
3. Insuring a strong US political, economic, defense position in Northeast Asia;

4. Involving the pace of Japanese rearmament;
5. Concerning the repayment of Japanese loans.

Potential confrontations due to conflicting interests in East Asia make it important for Japan to reassess her national security and defense posture in view of the American withdrawal of ground combat forces from the Korean peninsula. Under the assumption that the changing American posture in Asia casts some doubt on the credibility of America's commitment and resolve to fulfill her treaty obligations, the level of Japan's apprehension and her perception of the threat may well be heightened. Japan's concern focuses on three primary areas: (1) The growing presence of the Soviet Union in Asia; (2) The new international role of the PRC, and (3) The volatility of the Korean peninsula.

The Growing Soviet Presence

The Japanese do not identify by name the country they consider to be a direct threat to their national interests. The Soviet Union, however, because of its historical and ideological differences with Japan is generally considered the most threatening.¹ Repeated Japanese public opinion polls have shown the USSR to be the country most disliked by Japanese citizens.² Their distrust of Russia goes back to the Russo-Japanese War and has been highlighted since 1945 by a series of events which have given the Japanese reason to view the actions and interests of the Soviet Union with suspicion.

The first in the series of incidents occurred in August 1945 when the USSR belatedly declared war on an already defeated Japan despite a Neutrality Pact which had been in effect since 1941. It was also during this period that Japan had attempted to negotiate for peace through the


Russians.³ The Soviet Union then took advantage of Japan's weakness and attacked Manchuria, the southern portion of Sakhalin, and the entire Kurile Island chain taking in the process hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians prisoners to Siberia where they were interned in concentration camps for over ten years.⁴ The Soviets also called for the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal, refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and, until 1956, vetoed Japan's admission to the United Nations. These actions made lasting impressions on the Japanese postwar public.

Domestically, the attempts of the Soviet-sponsored Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in 1950 to generate internal turmoil through terror and violence in the form of strikes and riots reinforced this distrust. The role played by the JCP gave rise to the creation of the National Police Reserve (forerunner of the SDF) as a stabilizing force. When the communist organization lost favor with the Japanese public it was relegated to an underground role until the mid-1960's.

Militarily, the threat posed by the Russians in 1952 came in the form of fighter aircraft overflights violating the Hokkaido (Japan's northernmost island) airspace some 20-30 times. This Soviet action continued until US aircraft reinforcements were brought in as a deterrent.⁵ The Soviets today still continue their reconnaissance flights along Japan's coastlines supplemented by frequent naval incursions into Japanese waters.

The major source of contention between Moscow and Tokyo are the "Northern territories" dispute and the fisheries confrontation. The latter has involved Soviet restriction of Japanese fishing fleets in

selected areas throughout the Sea of Okhotsk. It has resulted in the detention of Japanese fishermen and confiscation of their catches in what Russia has labeled "Soviet Seas."⁶ The "Northern territorial" question centers on Japan's claim to the four southernmost islands of the Kurile chain (Habomai archipelago, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu Islands) which were turned over to Russia in 1945 (Figure 4-1). The Japanese contend that the islands are an integral part of Japan and are not part of those territories renounced by her in 1952. But while the Japanese do have strong historical claims to the islands, their legal demand is weak based on the provisions of the Yalta Agreement, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and testimony by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida whereby Japan renounced her claims to these islands.⁷ The USSR has argued that the entire Kurile chain is theirs and the resolution of this issue could be settled with the signing of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty. The apparent inflexibility of the Soviet Union, however, to resolve the territorial question on equitable terms has not only stirred the fires of Japanese nationalist and irredentist feelings but has prompted Japan to move closer to the PRC. The "Northern territorial" issue is a problem of burning concern which has been hopelessly deadlocked for many years and remains without a solution for the foreseeable future.



(Figure 4-1: Northern Islands)

Soviet forces positioned on the Habomai Islands are less than three miles from Hokkaido and represent the most visible threat to Japan.⁸ Kunashiri and Etorofu (ten miles and 95 miles respectively from Japan) have excellent airfields. The latter, in particular, has a good winter port and houses approximately 40 Soviet fighters.⁹ Recent intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets already have 5,000 to 6,000 combat troops positioned at installations on both of these islands. Strategically, these islands protect the southern approaches of the Soya Straits and serve as surveillance bases for monitoring sea traffic from the Sea of Okhotsk through the Kunashiri Channel. They also provide the Soviets with forward bases, deep water naval ports, a partial screen for her Siberian coast, and ready access to the Pacific Ocean. The significance of this threat to Japan might be measured by the positioning of 25,000 personnel or 30 percent of the GSDF on Hokkaido to act as the first line of defense in the event of a conventional Soviet attack from the north.¹⁰

Despite the traditional element of distrust, certain political obstacles have been set aside in favor of establishing trade and cultural relations which benefit both nations. The Soviet goal has been to enlist Japanese support for developmental projects in Siberia in return for natural gas, oil and other critical resources which Japan desperately needs.¹¹ Politically, the Soviet's intention since World War II has been to dissuade Japan from her non-communist ties and to gain favorable Japanese sentiment in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Each of these attempts by Moscow have thus far been failures.

The expansion of the Soviet Far Eastern forces (500,000 troops) poses one of the more serious threats to Japan. The bulk of Soviet ground forces in this region are organized into 43 divisions located primarily on the Sino-Soviet border. The formidable Soviet air force in East Asia now includes some 2,000 combat aircraft. A new series of tactical fighters and bombers have already started to complement the expanding Soviet air force contingent of MIG-21 fighters and TU-16 bombers in East Asia. All are capable of carrying the AS-9 missile with a range of 50 miles.¹² The level of Soviet air activity around Japanese airspace ostensibly to monitor Japan's air defense capability and American naval exercises is so high that the Japanese ASDF has had to scramble aircraft 528 times in 1976, some 497 times in 1977, and continues now on a daily basis to scramble her interceptors to meet what is referred to as the "Tokyo express" (Soviet planes near Japanese territorial airways) as well as those aircraft passing through Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone.¹³

The Soviet Far East Fleet is headquartered at Vladivostok which is located on the Sea of Japan 400 miles west of Japan and serviced by the trans-Siberian railroad. In addition, the USSR submarine fleet is stationed at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka peninsula approximately 850 miles from northern Japan. Russia's total of 450 ships (30 percent of her naval forces) is twice the size of the US Pacific Fleet and has the capability to interdict sea lines of communication over which oil tankers bound for Japan must travel.¹⁴ Inasmuch as Japan's supply lines stretch all over the world, the interdiction threat to Japan is a major concern. The two most susceptible transit lines for a Soviet blockade

include the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean route and, to the east, the long voyage from the America's across the Pacific Ocean. There is no question that successful interdiction efforts would require a significant air and naval force and the Soviet Union appears to be the only communist country with that capability.¹⁵ They have, in the last three years, conducted a number of impressive naval exercises in Japanese coastal waters and "mock convoy attacks" along shipping lanes as a demonstration of their "blue water" strength. In 1976 alone, 300 Soviet ships passed through the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits. Etorofu itself has been the site of joint airborne-amphibious operations conducted in large part by the now reinforced Soviet 6th Airborne Division. Clearly, the combination of the Soviet naval and air force elements continue to present a formidable threat to Japan's maritime SDF and her commercial life-lines. This point was made clear by Ko Maruyama, the Vice Minister of the Japanese Defense Agency, in a July 28, 1978 Defense Agency report which stated:

With the reinforcement of the Soviet military forces, their activities in the outlying ocean around and beyond Japan by naval ships and aircraft are becoming more intensified, and this appears to be aimed at increasing political and psychological influence over this area, not merely for training and intelligence purposes.¹⁶

The single most important threat Japan must face is the Soviet use of nuclear weapons. The Japanese cannot protect themselves from a ballistic missile attack and, as one of the most densely populated nations in the world (114 million people in an area no larger than California), Japan lacks strategic depth. As an example, more than 52 percent of Japan's population is heavily concentrated around the Osaka-Kobe and Toyko metropolitan areas. Her geographic proximity to the Asian

mainland puts her within range of the Soviet's tactical nuclear deliver systems.¹⁷ Consequently, the Japanese recognize that the Soviet armed forces quantitatively and qualitatively are far superior and that there is no way Japan could begin to match them. The primary equalizer for Japan has been the deterrent effect of her security treaty with the US.¹⁸ But based on the propensity of the Soviet naval fleet to fill the apparent security vacuum in Asian waters, Japanese analysts might well question the deterrent value of the US security umbrella.

Until 1973, the Soviet Union had been North Korea's major source in economic and military aid. This relationship was nurtured during the Stalinist years and in 1961 a defense alliance in the form of the USSR-DPRK Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed. Since 1961, however, this relationship has started to deteriorate as North Korea pursued a policy of self-reliance. For political and military reasons, Moscow prefers a divided Korea and fears that the unpredictable behavior of Kim Il-sung may drag them into a war not of their choosing. Consequently, Russia has not publically supported the belligerent pronouncements from Pyongyang nor has Kim Il-sung been received in Moscow since 1961. The result has been a decline in military support (\$249 million in 1973 to \$32 million in 1976) from the Soviet Union as well as a drop in trade.¹⁹ It is no wonder that Russia privately does not favor the withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula. The USSR realizes that the US presence in Korea has, as one observer noted, "kept the whole precarious house of cards in place."²⁰ This should not be construed to mean, however, that in the event of a North Korean invasion of South Korea that the Soviet Union would not come

to Kim Il-sung's assistance. There is little doubt that Moscow would supply Pyongyang, as it did Hanoi twice before, with military aid in the form of supplies and modern air defense systems. From a geostrategic concern, a base of operation for the Soviet Union in North Korea in terms of establishing free access to the Yellow Sea would be of tremendous importance. On a politico-military scale, Moscow would be demonstrating her ideological support for her communist neighbor while simultaneously attempting to stem the influence of Peking in this region.

The New PRC Thrust

Japanese feelings towards the PRC since the postwar period has often been described as schizophrenic. Despite hostility towards the PRC, Japanese public opinion has supported the normalization of relations with the mainland.²¹ In terms of the immediate post World War II period, this hostility was rooted initially in the USSR-PRC Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in February 1950. This alliance between Japan's major Asian neighbors was the first overt measure against the Japanese people since the close of the war. The purpose of the treaty as outlined in Article I was to prevent "the resumption of aggression and violation on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly, or indirectly in acts of aggression."²² Inasmuch as Japan had renounced war and was completely demilitarized, the tacit objective of the treaty, however, was directed at the US whose position during this period in Japan and Okinawa was viewed as threatening to the PRC and Soviet interests. Ensuing events which exacerbated Sino-Japanese relations included: China's role in the Korean War, the solidification of the US-Japanese alliance, the Japanese

Nationalist Chinese Peace Treaty concluded on April 28, 1952, and the exclusion of the PRC from signing the Peace Treaty with Japan. But, despite American pressure on Japan to recognize Taipei rather than Peking, Prime Minister Yoshida made his views clear on the importance of Japan's future relations with mainland China when he stated:

The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's closest neighbor.²³

The Yoshida government was optimistic that a rapprochement between them would eventually emerge. Yoshida's sensing of the uniqueness and importance of the Sino-Japanese tradition and the necessity of maintaining that relationship was re-emphasized when he declared in January 1951:

. . . China remains our next door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers.²⁴

The initial lessening of Sino-Japanese tensions came in 1953 when measures were taken to establish unofficial cultural and business ventures with the PRC. Each realized that their past differences should not interfere with interests which were mutually advantageous. Consequently, the normalization of relations proceeded in 1954 with a series of exchange visits by business, labor, and cultural delegations.²⁵ The Japanese position during the 1950's was one of keeping the lines of communication open by means of "cultural diplomacy" thereby transcending the currents of political impasse through people-to-people contact. During the 1960's, both Prime Minister Ikeda's pragmatic approach and later Sato's more conservative doctrine served to cut across political and military differences. Each stressed Japan's international trade interests which had been an on-going and mutually profitable venture

since the early 1950's. It was a policy designed to "separate politics from economics" which served to heighten the Sino-Japanese normalization process until the late 1960's.²⁶ From 1966 through 1969, this relationship was once again interrupted through a combination of factors to include Japan's concern over the PRC's nuclear ascendancy, the activities of the JCP, and the domestic crisis caused by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China.

Two years later, with the first "Nixon shock" in July 1971 and the exclusion of Nationalist China from the United Nations, Japan was obliged to reassess her China policy. This was followed by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's September 1972 visit to the PRC culminating in the Sino-Japanese statement which recognized the PRC as the official Chinese government.²⁷ Subsequently, diplomatic relations were established and since then, the nature of this relationship has been friendly and economically profitable with increased trade exchanges projected to exceed \$11 billion by 1982.²⁸ Japan today is the PRC's largest trading partner and continues to seek Chinese raw materials and oil while the PRC looks forward to the infusion of Japanese capital, advanced technology, management expertise, and industrial equipment. The normalization process reached a high point on August 12, 1978 when Japan and the PRC signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty in Peking. This 10-year agreement bound both nations not to go to war with each other and to resolve any disputes through peaceful means.

One of the more probable events which Tokyo and Peking may yet have to come to terms over involve their respective positions with reference to the possible outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. China's

long-standing support for North Korea's position on reunification has kept the PRC and the DPRK closely allied. The PRC, however, still wants a peaceful reunification whereby both sides may freely come to the conference table.²⁹ Since 1973, Chinese military aid has surpassed the Soviet Union. The identification of the cult of the leader and North Korea's own interpretation of the Great Leap Forward has made China the most influential external actor in North Korean affairs.³⁰ Its a position which involves two important features. First, her friendship with North Korea allows China to maintain a buffer between herself and the Soviet Union in terms of the 800-mile border between North Korea and China. The Chinese, in essence, cannot afford a hostile government under Soviet sponsorship to operate in North Korea. Second, the PRC's commitment to North Korea in terms of their defense clause under the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty signed in September 1961 is even more important today. In view of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US, the PRC has no desire to become involved in another war on the Korean peninsula. Since early 1975, Peking has continuously cautioned Kim Il-sung against an attack upon the south and has privately indicated that China views the presence of American troops in East Asia as a stabilizing force and a countermeasure to the Soviet propensity to fill whatever security vacuum may exist should the United States withdraw from this region.³¹

The PRC is not currently a major military threat to Japan. The combination of the United States nuclear umbrella, China's defensive orientation toward the Sino-Soviet border, Pekings inability to conduct a

sustained attack against Japan, and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty have all served to minimize the Chinese threat to Japan. If such a threat should develop, however, what might the Japanese face?

The Army contingent of the Chinese military establishment is the largest in the world and is comprised of some 3.6 million personnel organized into 11 armored divisions, 121 infantry divisions, 3 airborne divisions, 40 artillery divisions, 15 railway and construction engineer divisions and 150 independent regiments.³² Because of the Army's limited mobility, obsolete equipment and weapons, and preoccupation with the tension on the Sino-Soviet border, these forces are not considered a direct threat to Japan.

The Chinese navy, which is the third largest in the world, consists of 300,000 personnel.³³ It has the primary mission of coastal defense and protecting China's seaboard trade and fisheries as well as overwatching possible choke points in the event of a conflict.

The real threat resides in the combined military strength of China's air and missile forces. The air force, composed of 400,000 personnel and 5,000 combat aircraft, is a potentially formidable force.³⁴ Despite the fact that the PRC could not conduct a major air attack on Japan, it could, nonetheless, launch a series of limited attacks on selective targets. Because of Japan's weak command and control network, inadequate warning system, and her self-imposed rules of engagement, the Japanese air defense system is particularly vulnerable.³⁵

The greatest concern for Japan today is the development of the Chinese nuclear weapons system and the concomitant improvement of her

delivery means. Since the PRC began her nuclear tests in October 1964, twenty-three atmospheric tests have been conducted with the latest initiated in March 1978 in the 20 kiloton range. She has already launched five satellites into space and is reported to have in development the rudimentary stages of a sea-launched ballistic missile system. The PRC's fighter aircraft also have nuclear delivery means and its air force possesses a ballistic missile system capable of ranges up to 3,500 miles.³⁶ With China's supply of plutonium and the capability of its plutonium and uranium plants, it is estimated that some 3,000 nuclear warheads could be manufactured.³⁷

In the last analysis, the central focus of Japan's perception of the PRC threat will continue to revolve around China's preoccupation with the Soviet Union and the necessity of maintaining the bulk of her forces in a defensive posture on the Sino-Soviet border. Given the present state of affairs in East Asia, this situation appears to be the most ideal for Japan. Nonetheless, two conditions could possibly upset this balance. First, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement and a united threat against Japan could certainly upset the regional and international balance of power. The possibility of this condition developing according to most analysts appears remote. Second, another Korean War may find the PRC and Japan supporting opposite sides. Peking could elect to support North Korea while Japan provided economic aid to South Korea and/or the use of Japanese territory for the staging of American troops and supplies in support of South Korea. In the event of the expansion of these hostilities, Japan by the nature of her defense structure would find herself vulnerable to a Chinese military threat.

Precariousness of the Korean Peninsula

In November 1969, U. Alexis Johnson, then the United States Under Secretary of State, noted in his testimony before a US Senate subcommittee:

. . . the biggest threat to Japanese security lies in the continual tension on the Korean peninsula. While the North Koreans cannot directly threaten Japan, a communist takeover of the entire peninsula would seriously affect Japan's security interests, and a Korean conflict, with all the uncertainties it would unloose of possible participation by the major powers, would clearly affect Japan's own security.³⁸

For Japan, the maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula has been the most essential element for peace in Northeast Asia. The visible presence of US combat forces in South Korea since the signing of the armistice on July 27, 1953 has helped to stabilize the military and political situation there in three ways. First, as part of the United Nations Command, it has given an air of international legitimacy to its truce-keeping mission and has restrained the South Korean government from military actions north of the 38th parallel. Second, the deterrent effect provided by the 2d Infantry Division supplemented with its array of combat support elements has been a vital link in the I Corps (ROK/US) Group defensive network. Third, the positioning of the 2d Infantry Division north of Seoul in the vicinity of the DMZ acts as a "trip-wire" mechanism by assuring an automatic involvement by the US should hostilities begin. It is generally contended that the removal of American ground troops will minimize the deterrent effect and likewise increase the chances of a second Korean War breaking out. As LTG John H. Cushman (Retired), former Commanding General, I Corps (ROK/US) Group, noted:

. . . no U.S. air or logistic presence can fully substitute for the deterrent value of U.S. ground forces. U.S. ground forces on the scene have that unique ability to assure a friend and a potential foe alike that the United States without question would be engaged.³⁹

The key figure and catalyst in a possible scenario involving military hostilities is Kim Il-sung, the Stalinist President and dictator of the DPRK who has committed himself to the reunification of Korea by force. His plan calls for the military reunification (rather than a transitional confederation) of Korea by means of war and revolution. He made his point clear in February 1968:

Only when we use force of arm can we gain power. We cannot gain power simply by holding elections. The most decisive and positive of all forms of struggle is the struggle with arms for the liberation of our people.⁴⁰

Kim's intent as he continues to strengthen his military forces to carry out his "splendid blueprint" calls for the reunification of Korea during his lifetime (he is 63).⁴¹

Kim Il-sung's analysis of the withdrawal process will probably focus on three major considerations: (1) South Korea's growing strength; (2) America's resolve to support South Korea; and (3) USSR/PRC support to North Korea. The first might cause him to act now rather than face a stronger ROK later. The latter two could lead him to believe that a security void exists as a result of the 2d Infantry Division pullout and that an attack by his country would be successful.

In the first case, much will depend on his perception of South Korea's military capability and political ability to thwart an invasion from the North. The effectiveness of the United States transfer of arms and equipment to the ROK army as a substitute for the presence of an American division will be a major consideration which he cannot afford to

misjudge. Additionally, his reading of the level of political instability in South Korea so as to provide him a fertile ground for intervention must be carefully weighed against a number of factors. The anti-northern sentiment produced by the invasion of 1950 is still strong, and there is little trace of an insurgency element in South Korea or any semblance of a South Korean communist party to fan the flames of insurrection.⁴² Nonetheless, if the opportunity presents itself, Kim Il-sung has already outlined his intentions when he stated on April 18, 1975 in his visit to Peking:

If revolution takes place in South Korea, we as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms, but will strongly support the South Korean people. If the enemy ignites war recklessly we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the oppressors. In this war we will only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the country's reunification.⁴³

Second, Kim Il-sung's reading of the US resolve to support South Korea in the event of another war will also be a major determinant as he assesses America's Asian role for the 1980's. The level of America's credibility with her Asian allies in the past decade is a key indicator. It could cause North Korea to believe that the US resolve and international backbone are weak and that the Carter administrations apprehension about becoming involved in a land war in Asia may lessen American support to South Korea in the event of another war. Much will depend, in essence, on Kim Il-sung's interpretation of America's diplomatic rhetoric to support South Korea. Given the new geographic location of ground troops (Okinawa, Hawaii, CONUS), will he be impressed by an American naval or air show of force? Will his obsession to move south bring the United States only to the point of inaction and superpower frustration?

In light of President Carter's plan to terminate the US-ROC Mutual Security Treaty by December 31, 1979, how sure can the forces on the Korean peninsula be that the US will fulfill her defense obligations under the US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty? The evidence suggest that these are questions that Japanese analysts and leaders continue to entertain in their formulation of national security policy decisions. The most recent Japanese Defense White Paper expressed this concern in July 1978 when it stated:

. . . the withdrawal not only may effect the actual military balance but still worse, may give an impression that the U.S. commitment on the defense of South Korea is being eroded, thereby having an unfavorable impact on the political stability of South Korea, and there is also a danger that North Korea may overestimate the implication of such a situation in formulating its policy.⁴⁴

Additionally, Kim Il-sung would no doubt consider the tenor of Japanese political thinking with respect to America's use of forward basing on Japanese territory to support South Korea against another North Korean invasion.

Third, North Korea would have to critically assess the Sino-Soviet rivalry and their interest in the Korean peninsula at that time. In view of the changing East Asia international environment (the tenuous US-USSR détente, US-PRC normalization of relations, and the budding Japanese relationship with both the PRC and the USSR), Kim Il-sung's decision to give the PRC and/or the USSR prior notice with respect to an attack on South Korea may well hinge on whether he views their total support would be forthcoming during the initial stages of military hostilities. If such support were left in doubt, Kim might still be tempted to move without consultation creating a turn of events which could possibly leave his allies no choice in the end but to support his actions.

Kim Il-sung has set as North Korea's primary national objective the buildup of his armed forces while subordinating civil economic programs. This rearmament of forces gives the DPRK the fifth largest army in the world behind the PRC, the USSR, the US, and India.⁴⁵ The force ratio of this militarization program compared to that of the ROK appears in Figure 4-2.

	1970		1977	
	ROK	DPRK	ROK	DPRK
Personnel:				
Active forces	634,000	400,000	600,000	520,000
Reserve forces	1,000,000	1,200,000	2,800,000	1,800,000
Maneuver divisions	19	20	**19(21)	**25(41)
Ground balance:				
Tanks	900	600	*1,100	1,950
APC	300	120	*400	*750
Assault guns	0	300	0	*105
Artillery/MRL	1,750	3,300	*2,000	*4,335
Air Balance:				
Jet combat aircraft	230	555	*320	*655
Other military aircraft	*35	130	200	*320
AAA guns	850	2,000	*1,000	*5,500
Navy combat vessels	60	190	*80-90	*425-450

*These are approximations. Actual figures may be greater.

**Latest intelligence estimates credit the DPRK with 41 maneuver divisions and brigades. The ROK currently has 21 maneuver divisions.

Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea, 1978, p. 27.

(Figure 4-2. Korean Force Balance Comparison)

The advantages in terms of the Soviet-supplied firepower (mobile assault, jet aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and naval vessels) favor North Korea and with the draft age now set at 16, the size of their armed forces will remain superior. Other factors to be considered which appear to give North Korea in the attacker role a decided advantage are as follows:

PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA⁴⁶

North Korea (generally offensive deployment)

More ground combat divisions.
Greater ground firepower.
More armor assets.
Superior naval forces.
More air assets.
Better air defense system.
Larger logistics production.
Greater military production.
Capability of surprise.
Ability to concentrate attacking forces.
Distance to Seoul.
More commando-type forces.
Proximity of major allies.

South Korea (generally defensive deployment)

Advantage of terrain and defensive positions.
More modern air assets.
Better educated military leadership.
Vietnam combat experience.
Better transportation network.
Continued US deterrence.

The nature of North Korea's offensive posture can be further clarified by the following:

1. North Korea continues to import and produce numerous offensive weapons and has the capability to produce T-62 tanks.
2. North Korea has a sustained supply reserve of 30 to 90 days.
3. Nearly all North Korean maneuver divisions and brigades are within 100 miles of the DMZ in an attack posture; Division level exercises have been resumed after a lapse of several years.
4. Over 800 hardened artillery sites are positioned just north of the DMZ and many have the capability of shelling ROK positions and radar sites as well as the surrounding area of Seoul.
5. FROG-7 surface-to-surface missiles north along the DMZ are capable of hitting the city of Seoul.
6. MIG-21 aircraft deployed on airfields along the DMZ can embark on tactical strikes and reach Seoul within 2-3 minutes.
7. North Korean naval bases near the DMZ permit missile firing boats and submarines to concentrate on the South Korean coastal areas.
8. Special commando forces are primed for night parachute and insurgency operations.⁴⁷

Congressional testimony has already revealed that North Korea, next to the USSR, is "probably the most heavily militarized state in the world" and reported to be "in a position to launch a major surprise attack with little or no warning."⁴⁸

The sum total of all of these elements appear to give North Korea, in a blitzkrieg attack against Seoul as a limited objective, a decided advantage at least in the initial stages of hostilities. Without the presence of the 2d Infantry Division and its support elements, the burden would then fall on the combined efforts of the ROK and the US air and naval forces. How quickly the tide of battle can change to favor the south will then depend on the degree of involvement the US chooses to undertake in a sustained conflict. Some would contend that, without the direct involvement and danger to American ground troops, the extent of the US participation would be piecemeal. America's decision and response would no doubt be the supreme test in the eyes of her allies. For Japan, in particular, it would reflect the strength of America's credibility and resolve to back her commitments to the South Korean people.

Since the end of the Korean conflict, North Korea has initiated countless hostile incidents against the south leading to the murders of 54 Americans and several hundred South Korean soldiers.⁴⁹ From 1967 through 1975, there have been reported over 1,922 North Korean armed violations in the DMZ.⁵⁰ One of the more infamous events was the January 21, 1968 attack by 30 heavily armed North Korean infiltrators on President Park Chung Hee's Presidential Palace, the Blue House. A week

after the raid, North Korea seized the US naval ship Pueblo in international waters where one crew member was killed and the rest of the crew imprisoned in North Korea for 11 months. In November 1968, a month before the release of the Pueblo crew, a North Korean amphibious force of 120 infiltrators attempted to establish a base on the ROK southern coast. These series of events were followed by the shooting down of an American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over international waters in 1969. With the announced plans for the pullout of the 7th Infantry Division in 1970, South Korea made an effort to enter into a non-aggression pact with the North but the proposal was turned down by the DPRK.

On August 15, 1974, another effort was made to assassinate President Park. This time the lone assassin missed in his attempt and instead shot and killed President Park's wife. By November of that year and March of the following year, two mammoth tunnels under the DMZ constructed by North Korean soldiers capable of infiltrating men and equipment into South Korea were discovered. The first tunnel was 1.5 miles long, four feet high and four feet wide complete with concrete walls, ceiling with electric lighting, and a narrow-gauge railway. The second was 50 yards below ground, 5 kilometers long, and approximately 6 feet high and 6 feet wide. It had been under construction for two years and, given several more months without detection, would have bypassed some of the forward positions of South Korean forces on the DMZ (Figure 4-3).⁵¹

These tunnel discoveries were followed by the North Korean sinking of a ROK fishing vessel, the seizure of another in South Korean territorial waters; in September 1975 North Korean gunboats attacked a

Japanese fishing boat and killed two fishermen. These incidents continued through 1975 with the brutal beating of a US Army officer at Panmunjon by North Korean soldiers. This was followed on August 18, 1976 with the axe murder of two more American officers on the DMZ and later in July 1977 with the shooting down of an unarmed Army helicopter which had accidentally strayed across the DMZ resulting in the deaths of three Americans and one captured. Then on October 16, 1978, a third tunnel was discovered. Buried some 70 yards below the surface and dug through granite rock, the tunnel was large enough to permit a fully armed division of troops to pass through each hour. It had been extended some 1,427 feet into South Korea and was no more than two miles from the United Nations site at Panmunjon.⁵²



North Korea's military tunnels threaten South's defence line

Source: David Rees, "North Korea: Undermining the Truce," Conflict Studies, No. 69 (March 1976): 7.

(Figure 4-3. DMZ Tunnels)

The compilation of these aggressive actions, the comparative build-up of North Korean military forces, and the expressed intent of Kim Il-sung to unify Korea during his lifetime vividly illustrates the volatile nature and precarious circumstances which are present on the Korean peninsula. The presence of US ground combat troops north of Seoul has for the past twenty-five years acted as a stabilizing force and a deterrent to a North Korean invasion and South Korea's concern over the removal of the 2d Infantry Division is easily understood. As MG John K. Singlaub, former Chief of Staff of US forces in Korea, noted in his testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services:

If the North Korean planner is faced with a situation in which that force is sitting in a position where it could move astride either of the two major avenues coming into Seoul, he is faced with a serious military problem. He has to contend with that and produce a force that can overcome it. But more important, in my view, is the fact that he must recognize that it is a U.S. force. That is the tip of an iceberg of U.S. combat power If that force were removed, that element of constraint would also be removed, that is, Kim could launch his attack without fear of running into U.S. ground forces That element of deterrence . . . cannot be replaced by any number of ROK divisions.⁵³

And so it is that the element of deterrence is the key. If in fact the 2d Infantry Division was the inhibiting factor in the face of North Korea's plans for an invasion, does its deployment back to the United States increase the risk of large scale hostilities in Korea? And if the probability for military action on the part of North Korea is greater, how credible is America's assurances of providing effective support to South Korea? Kim Il-sung's perception of the strength and weakness of America's resolve become the governing factor in this equation. He has already shown that his understanding of America's intentions is poor. How he views this unilateral withdrawal without a corresponding action on

his part to help share in alleviating tensions on the Korean peninsula is a question which was once before raised in June 1949 and answered with a North Korean surprise attack on June 25, 1950. What he must be made to realize in this case is that the United States is not totally committed to the withdrawal time schedule unless the conditions are right and are in the interests of peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Recent events in Southeast Asia and the updated intelligence reports on North Korea's increased strength have caused the Carter administration to reassess the withdrawal schedule with the expectation of extending the final withdrawal date to 1984.

Japanese leaders have been perplexed by the US troop withdrawals. Their reading of what appears to be various shades of the threat from the Soviet Union, the PRC, and in particular the Korean peninsula, have made it necessary for them to plan for those measures which will insure the security of Japanese interests. But to date, little has been done. The course of action Japan chooses will have to be balanced against her perception of the changing nature of the Washington-Moscow-Peking axis.

CHAPTER 4

ENDNOTES

¹Rowen, "Japan and the Future Balance in Asia," p. 194.

²Muraoka, "Japan Security and the United States," p. 38.

³Kazuo Kawai, "Mokusatsu: Japan's Response to the Potsdam Declaration," Pacific Historical Review 19 (November 1950): 409.

⁴Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 237.

⁵Muraoka, p. 11.

⁶Ibid., p. 14. Since 1946, 1,336 fishing boats have been seized and 11,316 fishermen captured. Of these totals, 826 boats and 11,265 fishermen have been returned while 22 boats were sunk and 22 men killed. See also John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 21.

⁷Donald C. Hellmann, ed., Japan and East Asia, (London: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 181.

⁸Theodore McNelly, ed. Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics, p. 155. See also William E. Griffith, ed. The World and the Great-Power Triangles, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1975), pp. 309-316 and Epsey C. Farrell, "The Northern Territories in Japanese-Soviet Relations," Asian Affairs 3 (May/June 1976): pp. 305-313.

⁹Tracy Dahlby, "Moscow's Warning Shot Backfires," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (June 23, 1978): 29.

¹⁰Sheldon W. Simon, "Japan's Foreign Policy: Adjustments to a Changing Environment," Asian Survey 18 (July 1978): 669.

¹¹Muraoka, pp. 12-13.

¹²Presentation by Colonel Tada, Japanese liaison officer at the Command and General Staff College on "The Japanese Perspective of the Pacific," May 31-June 1, 1977, p. 8. See also Russell Spurr, "Ominous Implications of Red Power Plays," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (June 23, 1978): 75. The new series of tactical fighters and bombers include the MIG-23/25, SU-19, and the TU-26.

¹³Ibid. See also Peggy L. Falkenheim, "Some Determining Factors in Soviet-Japanese Relations," Pacific Affairs 50 (Winter 1977-78): 604.

¹⁴Simon, "Japan's Foreign Policy," p. 670. See also presentation by Colonel Tada and Zumwalt and Bagley, "Strategic Deterioration," p. 119. The Soviet Pacific Fleet includes 7 cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 125 submarines (50 of which are nuclear powered).

¹⁵Franklin B. Weinstein, ed., U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: The New Decade (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 61.

¹⁶Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, Summary (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, July 18, 1978), p. 6.

¹⁷Scalapino, The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, p. 362.

¹⁸It is recognized that the USSR suffers strategically from a shortage of naval and air force bases in this region. She is especially vulnerable operating in the Sea of Japan inasmuch as her only three means of egress from her port at Vladivostok (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima Straits) to the Pacific Ocean can be controlled by Japan and the US. However, the changing status of Asian nations (Vietnam's Camranh Bay and the US base rights problem with the Philippines) and the reduced presence of the US Seventh fleet may well offset some of these potential Soviet vulnerabilities.

¹⁹Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, p. 11. See Gareth Porter, "Time To Talk With North Korea," Foreign Policy No. 34 (Spring 1979): 59.

²⁰Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," Foreign Affairs 56 (October 1977): 163.

²¹Muraoka, p. 38.

²²John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma, (New York: Dunellen Publishing, 1971), p. 205.

²³Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 759.

²⁴Shigeru Yoshida, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," Foreign Affairs 29 (January 1951): 179.

²⁵Donald P. Whitaker et al., Area Handbook for Japan, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 368.

²⁶George Jan, "The Japanese People and Japan's Policy Toward Communist China," Western Political Quarterly 22 (September 1969): 605.

²⁷See New York Times, September 30, 1972, p. 12 for the complete text of the Chinese-Japanese communiqué signed by Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.

²⁸Muraoka, p. 18. A 10-year \$20 billion trade agreement was signed in February 1978 which calls for China to trade its primary products for Japanese technology. See Far Eastern Economic Review, August 25, 1978, p. 13.

²⁹Tracy Dahlby, "A Great Alliance as the Lion Awakes," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (November 3, 1978): 11.

³⁰David Rees, "North Korea: Undermining the Truce," Conflict Studies No. 69 (March 1976): 12.

³¹Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 170. See also Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, p. 12. Teng Hsiao-ping, China's Vice-Premier, noted that his government would be favorably disposed to the US naval expansion in East Asia. Christian Science Monitor, January 11, 1979, p. 2.

³²IISS, Military Balance, p. 56.

³³Ibid., pp. 56-57. This includes 30,000 naval air and 38,000 marines aboard some 75 submarines, 11 destroyers, 12 frigates, 14 patrol boats, and 30 submarine chasers. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, July 3, 1977, pp. 30-31.

³⁴These aircraft include the LI-28s and MIG-15s/17s/19s/21s. The PRC has 80 TU- Badgers which are medium range bombers. Their range of 1,650 miles is enough to cover all of the Japanese islands. They are now locally produced.

³⁵Japanese rules of engagement prohibit a Japanese interceptor from firing on a foreign aircraft unless the former is attacked first.

³⁶IISS, Military Balance, p. 55. See also Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option, p. 19.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations, p. 40.

³⁹Paper presented at the Interuniversity Seminar and Combined Arms Center Symposium on Tactics and Military Posture, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 30 through April 1, 1978 by LTG John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired, Commanding General, I Corps (ROK/US) Groups (February 1976-February 1978).

⁴⁰David Rees, "The Two Koreas in Conflict," Conflict Studies No. 94 (April 1978): 19.

⁴¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea. 95th Congress, 2d sess., April 26, 1978, p. 13.

- ⁴²Zagoria and Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," p. 1032.
- ⁴³Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, pp. 32-33.
- ⁴⁴Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1978, pp. 6-7.
- ⁴⁵Army Times, February 5, 1979, p. 15.
- ⁴⁶Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, p. 28.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 31-32. See also Army Times, January 8, 1979, p. 21 and David Rees, "North Korea: Undermining the Truce," Conflict Studies No. 69 (March 1976), pp. 2-3.
- ⁴⁸LTG Victor H. Krulak, "Korea: Strategic Pivot of Asia," Strategic Review 5 (Fall 1977): 9.
- ⁴⁹Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Policy Decision, p. 14.
- ⁵⁰Zagoria and Kim, p. 1018.
- ⁵¹Rees, "North Korea," p. 4.
- ⁵²Shim Jae Hoon, "Digging for Victory," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (November 10, 1978): 16.
- ⁵³Committee on Armed Services, Review, p. 17.

CHAPTER 5

JAPANESE STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS

The impact of the American ground troop withdrawal from the Republic of Korea on Japanese national security will depend on a number of variables. Militarily, Japan will be concerned with the time-phasing, quantity, and types of units included in the withdrawal. Politically, this feature will be weighed against the current status of events on the Korean peninsula and further analyzed in the context of Japan's perception of the existence of a security vacuum there and the total impact on the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

How will the United States withdrawal as presently planned and partially executed affect Japan's national security interests? First, Japanese analysts and political observers must examine all possible scenarios which could emerge as a result of the US withdrawal. Second, they must match these scenarios with a variation of strategies, options, and courses of action available to Japan. Some of the possibilities resulting from the US pullout from Korea can be summed up briefly:

1. The DPRK might once again increase its military capability as it did in 1972 after the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division from Korea. Misread perceptions on the part of Kim Il-sung with respect to America's changing posture in Asia might prompt him to attack the South in anticipation that the US initially would be indecisive.

2. The Soviet Union might also choose to extend her already expanding military capability and politically support North Korea's

attack south in an effort to bolster her geographic and diplomatic posture with respect to the PRC, Japan, and the United States in light of the new series of arrangements in that triad.

3. Sensing a weakened US security alliance, Japan might seek closer ties with either the PRC and/or the Soviet Union.

4. South Korea's potential dissatisfaction with America's efforts to adequately supply military assets to compensate for the withdrawal of troops may precipitate the ROK's move toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

5. The fear of a heightened external attack from the North and the threat of an internal crisis might prompt South Korea to accelerate her war on domestic opposition forces and adversely affect the sentiment of the Korean minority living in Japan.

6. South Korean apprehension over the combined military strength of North Korea and the Soviet Union might prompt the ROK to come to terms with the DPRK resulting in the eventual domination of the North in South Korean affairs.

7. In light of the US withdrawal from Asia, the termination of the ROC-US security treaty, and the PRC's incursion into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of China might be tempted to pursue an independent nuclear program.

8. The Philippines, given the expanding Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia and domestic nationalist pressures, might be forced to reassess and eventually terminate its base rights to the United States.

These scenarios are by no means all-inclusive. They do illustrate, however, the potential changes which may come into play as a result of America's ground combat withdrawal from South Korea. More importantly, they represent issues which may stimulate debate in Japan and cause the Japanese to consider in greater detail certain strategies and options to cope with possible changes in the East Asian balance of power structure.

No Major Change/Status Quo

Japan may be content with simply maintaining her present position. This requires no major change from her "omni-directional" foreign policy and continues to insure her current program of a balanced diplomacy. It is inherently a low risk option and because of Japan's alliance with the US, it permits the Japanese to continue their "equidistant" policy in the international arena. The success of this approach in the context of events on the Korean peninsula is dependent upon Japan's working relationship with the US, the ROK and the DPRK. A brief recapitulation of this quadrilateral connection underscores the importance of the status quo policy and the framework upon which it is presently based.

With respect to the American-Japanese relations, the US remains the primary overseas market for Japan, the major provider of foreign technology, the main outlet of foreign capital, and the sole nuclear deterrent to the Soviet Union and the PRC.¹ Although America's withdrawal from South Korea has threatened this relationship, Japanese leaders may choose to reaffirm and nurture the close working relationship developed over the past three decades with the United States. Foremost among these is the re-establishment of the trust and confidence which seems to have been

lost in the last decade. From the Japanese perspective, the "Nixon shocks" and America's posture in Asia have been of particular concern. For the US, there is an underlying demand for reciprocity and equality on Japan's part to do more in terms of shouldering the responsibility for her own defense. The question of how long the United States will continue to underwrite the defense of Japan is a variable always subject to change upon which the Japanese may not have adequate time to react. Japan's desire ostensibly to remain the junior partner in this bilateral alliance is not a position the US wishes to maintain indefinitely and as a result continues to urge Japan to assume a role somewhat commensurate with her position in the international arena.

The importance of the Japanese-South Korean relationship is interwoven in a series of economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties which have become an integral part of each country's vital interests. The predominance of Japanese grants, loans, aid, and investment in South Korea, replacing that previously held by the US, has given Japan a larger stake in the Korean peninsula. Likewise, South Korea's exports to Japan (second only to the US) have provided these Asian neighbors with a commonality of interests crucial to their economic well-being. The status quo option fosters this relationship and helps to insure stability in this region.

There is no question that Japan would welcome a lessening of tensions in Korea. Nonetheless, she is content with the current posture in terms of a friendly South Korean government as a buffer between the Japanese islands and a potentially hostile communist-controlled state. Japan is in no position to help the US militarily in support of South

Korea. The age-old Korean distrust of Japan and the Japanese public's attitudes are additional obstacles which make it nearly impossible, at least for the foreseeable future, for Japan to participate in a military alliance with South Korea. Indirect assistance from Japan in terms of economic aid, which permits South Korea to concentrate her efforts on military priorities, is at present the maximum extent of Japan's involvement in South Korea.

The Japanese-North Korean relationship in terms of Japan's status quo policy will find the Japanese attempting to maintain present lines of communication. As Japan branches out and becomes more assertive in the international arena, she may well find herself serving as the link between North and South Korea in an effort to avert misread perceptions, alleviate existing tensions, and help establish a more relaxed atmosphere of communication in order to insure understanding and foster stability. North Korea's current interest in Japanese technology, foreign trade, and exchange of visitors are important steps towards establishing understanding and cooperation.² The difficulties for Japan, however, if she should decide to serve as a bridge between North and South Korea, are apparent. First, Japan has no real economic stake in North Korea and, inasmuch as there are no internal or external pressures to extend herself as a conduit between the North and South, there remains very little incentive for Japanese action. The motivating factor altruistically for Japan would be peace on the peninsula which would require her to take the initiative and serve voluntarily as an intermediary. It is a role to which she is unaccustomed and may not be eager to pursue because of the inherent risks involved. Second, Japan's present contacts with the DPRK

have already stirred the anger of the ROK. There are persistent fears that Japanese contacts with North Korea will jeopardize aspects of South Korea's national security program. Japan-North Korea trade ties from the South Korean perspective, for example, may be viewed as indirectly strengthening the DPRK's military capability as well as adding to South Korea's competition as a major market source for Japan. There are also South Korean fears that the North Korea-Japan relationship may prompt Japan to diplomatically recognize the North which would bolster the DPRK's standing among the nations of the world. Third, Japan's obvious tilt toward South Korea in terms of her vested economic interests are met with North Korean criticism and distrust for similar reasons.

Proponents for the "status quo" option believe that this course of action will permit Japan to take maximum advantage of her security treaty with the US while providing Japanese leaders ample opportunity to concentrate on their economic and political endeavors. Unlike other available options, the "status quo" approach appears to offer maximum flexibility in terms of allowing Japan to make the transition to other courses of action should the need arise.

Rearmament

A second option available to Japan is an increased rearmament program. This course could run the full gamut quantitatively and qualitatively to include the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the procurement of a series of offensive weapons (i.e. tactical cruise missiles and long-range aircraft and ships), manufacturing and exporting arms, conscription, exceeding the "one percent of GNP" barrier on defense expenditures, and even Japan's participation in a United Nations peacekeeping role.

Supporters for this option presently see Japan as an economic giant and a military midget whose status in the world community needs to be brought into sharper focus. In essence, a greater balance should be maintained between her political, economic, and military structure in order to continue to insure her position in the international arena. It is a point of view which holds that a state is only as strong as its weakest link and for Japan that weakness is her military posture. The lessons learned by the Japanese in the mid-19th century when military weakness brought disaster and humiliation to Japan are contrasted with their 1890's policy of fukoku kyohei (wealthy nation, strong army) where Japan's strength militarily brought independence, international power, recognition, and respect. In view of the US withdrawal and the possibility of an increased threat to Japan, some Japanese may feel that the only thing worse than being responsible for your own defense is having someone else responsible for it.

There are many advantages and disadvantages in the rearmament option. An increased military posture would certainly change the Japanese political character and in the process increase her influence especially among the non-aligned nations. Conversely, a rearmed Japan could generate from certain segments of society outbursts of militarism reminiscent of the interwar period and enflame anti-Japanese sentiment. The notion of a remilitarized Japan could also to some degree change, if not shatter, the fragile balance of power in Asia and in the process possibly ignite a series of actions from a renewed arms race to a revised

system of security alliances. The perceptions of her Asian neighbors may be varied and the impact of a rearmed Japan is still a matter of speculation. Recent comments by Asian leaders with reference, for example, to the SDF's conduct of Japan's largest naval and air combined arms exercise in October 1978 are revealing. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yen said, "I am not alarmed . . . as long as Japan does not go nuclear and the forces operate under American nuclear umbrella, I am not alarmed."³ Even more important were the remarks by China's Vice-Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping when he told a Japanese delegation: "I am in favor of Japan's Self-Defense Force build-up."⁴

Rearmament proponents are apt to be confronted with a multitude of domestic difficulties, including strong opposition to any reinterpretation, if not a revision, of Japan's "Peace Constitution" or to conscription. These are two critically important items not yet amenable to change. Economically, an enhanced rearmament program would require a reorientation of critical resources to the military industrial sector. Japanese who have reaped and experienced the economic rewards of past decades may not be so willing to make such sacrifices for the rearmament option.

Economic Superpower/Superstate

The scenario which envisions Japan as an economic superpower/superstate might be considered a variation of the first option with the point of emphasis on increasing the tempo and expanding Japan's massive economic growth. The primary assumption is that Japan will not only continue to maintain her economic prosperity but will also have an opportunity to project her economic influence to even higher standards in her age

old quest to "catch up with the West." This would entail a greater emphasis on high technology industries, increased overseas investments, and capital exports. Domestically, this course of action would encompass a major move toward social welfare programs with the intent of creating a high-morale Japan content to play an active role in world affairs while enjoying the rewards of her efforts in all sectors of society.

Some of the inherent dangers in this option as Japan increases her position as a world power include the reluctant accommodations which other economic powers such as the US, Western Europe, and Russia would have to make in order to allow Japan to share in the world economic markets. Likewise, less developed countries, particularly in Asia, may resent and fear the domination of Japanese economic interests and resort to protectionism or the nationalization of Japanese businesses and industries as countermeasures. In this extreme, any attempt to cut Japan off from certain economic areas would limit the scope of Japan's diversified markets and adversely affect her economic pace. If Japan found herself in such a position, her rejection from part or all of the world community could ignite and flame nationalistic tendencies in Japan which could conceivably lead to Japan's move to militarism. A more realistic alternative will probably find Japan cautiously pursuing her economic goals as she slowly advances to the position of having the world's second largest GNP by 1990. Her stake in the world community economically at that point will be so great so as to prompt her to take a more active and influential interest in the stability of the international system.

Unarmed Neutrality

This course of action is based on the Japanese assuming a position of economic and political alliances in peace and neutrality in war. It is founded on a policy of an economic growth slightly lower than present standards. The primary traits in this approach are based on domestic abundance and the expansion of social and welfare expenditures. This would also include avoiding policies and actions which would tend to disrupt economic development. For example, an effort might be made to limit overseas investments and commitments which could involve Japan in sensitive political problems. There would continue to be an interest in multinational corporate concerns and exporting industries but not on the scale which would place Japan in a decisive leadership role. An effort would also be made to stockpile at least a years supply of raw materials as an attempt to temporarily limit Japan's dependence on imports. In terms of her national security, steps might be taken to modify significantly or even end her dependence on America's nuclear umbrella by embarking on a slow pace of defensive rearmament. The primary goal in the long run is to establish a foundation of stability and domestic tranquility. This course of action of limited global contacts and disengagement from military and political alliances would be a signal to the rest of the world, and in particular the Soviet Union and the PRC, that Japan desires to maintain a low posture and is not a threat to anyone.

Heavily Armed, Neutral Japan

This option which places Japan in a position of neutrality though heavily armed encompasses three major features which would radically change the nature of Japan's international and national character. The

first involves the establishment of a massive defense program to greatly enlarge the SDF; the second would include the development of nuclear weapons; and the third would entail a modification, if not the termination, of the US-Japan security treaty.

In terms of Japan's massive build-up of forces, there is no question that she has the industrial base in shipbuilding, electronics, automotive production, and missile technology to produce the necessary weapons. In order to make this massive transition, the Japanese would have to exceed their one percent GNP ceiling on defense expenditures, change their constitution to allow for the incorporation of offensive weapons in their force structure, reinstate a conscription program, and be able to participate in the sale and exchange of armaments abroad. These changes in themselves would have tremendous national and international ramifications as noted earlier.

The most radical of these changes would be Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. This abrupt shift in policy would be diametrically opposed to Japan's "three non-nuclear principles" (not to manufacture, possess, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan). There is no question that Japan's "nuclear allergy" still runs strong in nearly every sector of Japanese society and that acceptance of this option would create an adverse reaction and result in turmoil at home and abroad. The United States-Japanese security treaty which provides Japan with a "nuclear shield" presently obviates the need for Japan to embark on an independent nuclear weapons program. Should the Japanese lose confidence in the US deterrent and perceive the withdrawal from South Korea as a weakened link in this alliance system, the conditions might well be

set for Japan to engage in her own nuclear weapons program. If Taiwan and South Korea (not to mention North Korea) should attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in view of the pullout and the pending US-ROC treaty termination, Japan will have added cause to re-examine her nuclear weapons option. South Korea in particular has the capability to produce nuclear weapons.⁵ With one operating nuclear reactor and another under construction coupled with two uranium ore beds, it is possible that South Korea could produce a nuclear bomb in the foreseeable future given her acquisition of enriched uranium or plutonium.

For Japan strategically, the decision to pursue the nuclear option would probably be based on the theory of "proportional deterrence" which postulates that Japan as a medium-size nation could conceivably deter a militarily superior country by her ability to wreak unacceptable civil damage on any aggressor.⁶ Because of Japan's geographical proximity and constraints, this would presuppose her ability to employ a credible and survivable second-strike capability as well as her willingness to become involved in a nuclear exchange. Despite the fact that Japan could build a nuclear force superior to that of France and Great Britain, her fixed bases and mobile nuclear ground elements would be vulnerable because of the restricted Japanese terrain. In terms of developing the more mobile and clandestine nuclear submarines, Japan would be at a disadvantage in terms of her limited research and development in this area and the growing threat of the Soviet anti-submarine forces. In any case, a sea-based nuclear force complemented with an aircraft strike force would be the best deterrent system Japan could hope to establish with any degree of effectiveness.

A heavily armed Japan could be a major contributor to regional stability by assisting or replacing the US military power. However, a resurgence of Japanese militarism would be unsettling and generate fears particularly among Japan's Asian neighbors. But it is from the domestic perspective that the likelihood of Japan "going nuclear" would be improbable and an unwise course to follow in the face of severe domestic and international obstacles.

Pan-Asian Alliance

A Pan-Asian regional security system with Japan playing a major leadership role is another option which may have some appeal to Japanese leaders. Japan's cultural, geographic, and racial identification with her Asian neighbors and her imposing economic position on a global and regional scale places her in an ideal position to assume a prominent role in an Asiatic-Pacific alliance. One approach might be to elicit the support of China, the US, and the USSR as major participating members in this collective effort with the expressed objective of maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Japan's position in this collective alliance would involve an impartial and non-aligned course cautiously avoiding a role in the Sino-Soviet balance as well as striking a more independent line in her relationship with the US. This vast undertaking might entail changing the US-Japan security treaty to perhaps a more all-encompassing document (e.g., Peace and Friendship Treaty) involving the PRC and USSR which emphasizes economic and social interests first, and military assistance second. The aim would be to give this arrangement a multi-polar base rather than a bilateral one permitting Japan in the process to be the forerunner and initiator of this program.

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The starting point for this course of action might include some combination of the economic and political aspects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Asian Development Bank, and some of the military considerations inherent in the Australian, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) alliance. In the case of a Japan/ANZUS (JANZUS) arrangement which would be quite similar to NATO's SHAPE organization, defense planning, command and control, base and port utilization, and consultative agreements would be among the major areas of general interest in supporting a regionalized security structure.⁷ Likewise, a Japan/ASEAN arrangement to enhance the economic status of Asia in terms of trade, investments, aid, and development projects could be another major area within which Japan could play a significant role.

A problem with setting up an Asian regional structure is the fact that Asia, unlike Western Europe, for example, does not possess a unifying historical tradition to bind the interests of nation-states. Asia, instead, is a composite of civilizations and religions each with its own historical backgrounds and complexities. The Japanese themselves, as members of an advanced industrialized society, may find it difficult to identify with and be accepted by their Third World Asian neighbors. Additionally, Japan's efforts to assume a more prominent role, especially in Southeast Asia, could stir Asian fears of the recrudescence of Japan's prewar plan to re-establish a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Political Determinants

These six options are by no means all-inclusive. If anything, a combination of any of these courses of action to meet the security needs

of Japan could also be considered and proposed as viable choices by Japanese planners.

The primary determinant in this selection process will continue to be the domestic political forces in Japanese society. One of the more visible of these will be the Japanese public and their opinions on proposed policies and choices. Public opinion, that is the climate of opinion rather than articulated opinion, in Japan is one of the strongest and most analyzed aspects on the domestic scene.⁸ If the most recent published scientific survey conducted by the Japan Defense Agency in September 1977 is any indication, there is good cause to believe that the unarmed neutrality and the heavily armed through neutral options are not important considerations as far as the Japanese people are concerned. With respect to the future defense posture of Japan, the poll indicated that 33 percent were in favor of the status quo, 22 percent wanted a program which would keep abreast with science and technology, and only 11 percent wanted to see the strength of the SDF increased.⁹

The role of the Japanese press is another influential element in the policy formulation process. Coverage of President Carter's withdrawal plans, Vice-President Mondale's visit to Tokyo to "consult" with the Japanese, and Prime Minister Fukuda's subsequent visit to the US were all related aspects of the withdrawal decision which received much publicity. It appears that the press in general has not taken an overly prejudiced view in this matter and has ostensibly done well to serve the public interests as a communications channel between governmental policies and actions and the Japanese people. Inasmuch as the press has been relatively objective in this regard, it would appear that the status

quo option, more than any other, is the most acceptable choice at the present time.

The party system in Japan, since the early postwar years, has become an important force in the policy formulation process. It has traditionally been dominated by the ruling conservative-oriented Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and opposed by what has amounted to a series of divided, left-wing opposition parties. In terms of defense policy and security concerns, the primary issues have included the external threats to Japan, the US-Japan security treaty, the composition of the SDF, and the status of nuclear weapons in Japan. The reverberations of the US withdrawal has had a renewed importance in each of these areas which all parties must now address. The future force development of the SDF in particular will probably be the most hotly debated issue and the most susceptible to change as the trend to a more realistic and concrete national security and defense policy emerges. While the LDP has traditionally argued for a stronger SDF, the opposition parties have taken more of a pacifist approach calling for the dissolution of the SDF. Recent Japanese political developments, however, have shown some evidence that certain opposition parties (Komeito, Democratic Socialist Party, and New Liberal Club) are slowly revising their pacifistic attitudes in terms of supporting to varying degrees the US-Japan security treaty as well as the SDF.¹⁰ This should not be construed as a move toward a major transformation of Japan's national security and defense posture. It might, however, demonstrate a greater concern by the opposition parties for national security and a possible shifting of political consensus in support of the status quo option or a modified form of the rearmament.

Japan's defense strategists continue to play a small role in the determination of foreign policy. As the tenor of thinking slowly changes, their influence and expertise should become increasingly important. Two highly respected Japanese strategists, Kiichi Saeki of the Nomura Research Institute and Makoto Momoi of the National Defense College, have been among the most influential analysts in the last decade. Momoi, in particular, appears to support the US withdrawal from Korea as a means of highlighting the diminishing role of the US in Asia and pointing out the necessity for a stronger SDF. Momoi and Saeki do not necessarily support a heavily armed or a completely rearmed Japan. It appears that they would instead support a Japanese defense structure which encompassed a stronger air defense network, a reinforced anti-submarine warfare force, and an aircraft strike force capable of reaching Soviet naval sites in the Asian region. This group would probably support the status quo option with a modified rearmament variation.

An increasingly prominent segment in Japanese society concerned with national security is the Keidanren, the most influential business federation. The US pullout has added to the Keidanren's argument for additional arms expenditures and the development of a domestic capability to produce some of these arms. The balance of payments surplus, rising unemployment, business bankruptcies, and the slow down in Japan's growth rate have supported business and industry's claim for an enhanced defense posture. The realization that a rearmed Japan and the expanded overseas Japanese business interests might stir the flames of an overbearing and hostile Japan in Asia is still a major source of apprehension for Japan's neighbors. With this background, it is anticipated that the status quo

option with some variation of the rearmament course of action might be the more favorable choice.

The final element to be considered in the policy formulation process is the Japanese government and its bureaucratic organization. President Carter's withdrawal plan, ostensibly presented to the Japanese government fait accompli, created a situation which has now prompted the Japanese to reconsider the above selected options to meet the changing series of developments in this region. It is a position that the Japanese government may not want to be in but will have to face and act upon in order to keep up with the series of subsequent changes which will likely follow.

CHAPTER 5

ENDNOTES

¹Morley, Forecast for Japan, p. 207.

²Japan has been a major source for North Korea technology and equipment and in 1974 surpassed the Soviet Union in total imports to North Korea. See Joseph M. Ha, "U.S. Withdrawal From Korea: A Means, Not An End," Orbis 21 (Fall 1977): 621.

³Pillsbury, "A Japanese Card"?, p. 6.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, p. 33.

⁶Rowen, "Japan and the Future Balance in Asia," pp. 203-204.

⁷William T. Tow, "The JANZUS Option: A Key to Asian/Pacific Security," Asian Survey 18 (December 1978): 1231.

⁸Hellmann, Japan and East Asia, p. 58.

⁹Japanese Defense Agency, Defense Bulletin (Tokyo: JDA, Public Information Division, January 1978), p. 2.

¹⁰Japanese Defense Agency, Defense Bulletin (Tokyo: JDA, Public Information Division, October 1978), p. 51.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The immediate impact of the American ground troop withdrawal from the Republic of Korea on Japan's national security in the short-term will not be significant. As long as the United States-Japanese security treaty continues in force and serves as the cornerstone in this relationship, Japan's national security structure will remain relatively unchanged and the SDF will only realize moderate gains in terms of its own modernization and augmentation of forces.

The long-term effect of the withdrawal, however, should be a major concern to the Japanese people. Because Japan could find herself embroiled directly or indirectly in a second Korean War, it is important at the outset to consider steps she might take to meet and contend with this eventuality even before the outbreak of hostilities.

On a regional scale, the current situation in Northeast Asia makes it incumbent upon Japan to immediately maximize her diplomatic and economic leverage to help alleviate existing tensions. She might accomplish this by continuing her economic ties with the Republic of Korea while simultaneously increasing the tempo of her cultural, trade, and people-to-people programs with the intent of eventually establishing consulate and trade offices with the DPRK in a manner acceptable to the continuance of ROK-Japanese relations.

In a global context, the Ohira government will no doubt continue Japan's policy of "economic diplomacy." But an even broader approach

would be for Japan to take the initiative in sponsoring both Koreas as members in the United Nations. Such a move would bring both parties closer to the bargaining table thus helping to insure a greater dialogue and exchange of ideas. It would also give international exposure to these heavily armed camps placing them somewhere near the limelight under the pressure of world public opinion in an effort to ameliorate the seeds of discontent and conflict. This action would then set the stage for Japan to help initiate and establish bilateral and multilateral programs involving the US, USSR, and the PRC in conciliatory gestures toward both Koreas. It would also require a concerted effort by Moscow and Peking toward Seoul while simultaneously encouraging the Carter administration to open up communication links with Pyongyang. There is no question that if peace and stability are the desired ends, then active participation by the major actors in this region in conferences and exchange programs are the necessary means of enhanced mutual understanding, cooperation, and communication. As a minimum, the assemblage of potential antagonists would at least help to identify issues and problems which customarily serve as the catalyst for armed conflict. The totality of these initiatives implemented by Japan at this juncture is a prerequisite to peace which the Japanese people can hardly afford to let pass. It would appear, however, that past indicators and the tenor of the times do not support such a move on Japan's part. At best, it is surmised that Japan will maintain a steady low-key diplomatic course sparing herself from the risks of international politics.

In the event of an all-out attack by North Korea on South Korea the courses of action which Japan would pursue are varied. It is highly

unlikely that she would engage in direct military participation in spite of the unanticipated coalition of friends and enemies which could emerge. Japan's political constraints and the memory of Japanese rule on the Korean peninsula make this option prohibitive. At best, Japan's involvement would be limited to providing the United States to some degree with forward base and port facilities as a means of enhancing the US logistic effort in support of South Korea. She could also help contribute to the modernization of South Korea's forces by continuing to provide aid for heavy industries.¹ At one extreme, the possibility of Japan surreptitiously providing "advisors" and "technicians," either civilian or military, may not be out of the realm of possibility in the confusion of wartime circumstances.

As a result of the extension of this conflict involving the defeat of Seoul by North Korean forces ending in the forceful reunification of Korea, the array of problems for Japan would be substantially magnified. The threshold of threat to Japan, politically, militarily, and now geographically, would be greatly increased. More importantly, the "loss" of South Korea itself would cast a grave shadow of doubt over the US-Japan security alliance. The inability of the United States to respond and prevent the circumstances depicted would no doubt embroil Japan in a series of domestic debates as to a course or courses of action it ought to follow in order to meet these new series of developments.

I would argue that the most likely option which Japan will pursue, given the above circumstances, is that of a selective course of rearmament. It is, however, a program which will commit Japan not to rearm anymore than is necessary. In essence, Japan will continue with her

incremental advances and improvements in her current force structure strictly on a conventional scale.

There are a number of important factors which will set the pace and drive this gradual rearmament process. Japanese nationalism, for example, manifested in a sense of heightened national pride, renewed self-confidence, mission, and a yearning for international recognition and respect will become increasingly significant. Its a type of constructive nationalism, unlike the period of the 1930's, which as one prominent Japanese observer noted "impels Japan to be sekaichi (tops in the world) in every possible way."²

Another feature will involve Japan's perception of the role she ought to play as an economic superpower. Some would postulate that Japan, with her rapidly developing economic power structure, will soon seek and reach out for a concomitant military posture. I would contend that Japan's militaristic and tragic wartime experiences have imbued her with a sense of pragmatism the likes of which have shown that wealth and prosperity do not necessarily require a massive military posture. The flip side of this thinking assumes that Japan's economic growth will not infringe on or challenge, in the future, the rest of the world. The apparent presupposition is that Japan will be free from any enemies and world conflict and accepts in the process the futility of a military force.

An additional factor which may help drive the pace of rearmament is the expressed concern regarding the security of Japan's overseas trade and investment interests especially in Southeast Asia and the trade

routes through the Indian Ocean. The feasibility of Japan extending herself in this area is at best speculative and will no doubt continue to generate increased debate especially if the Soviet naval fleet is perceived as the dominant power in this region.

The most important driving factor in determining the pace of Japanese rearmament will be their reaction to what some perceive to be a US retrenchment in Asia and the possible "unraveling" of the US-Japan alliance. If this perception continues, it would be erroneous to blatantly conclude that Japan would automatically rearm and fill the void left by the United States. The political, psychological, social, and economic climate in Japan would not permit such a drastic course of action. Nonetheless, I would argue that Japan's military posture in the next decade would include a number of modifications.

The gradual pace of Japan's rearmament will include a qualitative and quantitative increase in sophisticated weaponry and equipment. The semantic distinction between offensive and defensive weapons and equipment is slowly eroding. The Diet's acceptance of the F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft into the ASDF inventory without serious opposition from the press, the public, or the opposition parties, is a current indicator of this attitudinal change. Additionally, it appears that greater attention is being given to offensive weapons (air-to-air refueling tankers and "small" aircraft carriers) in terms of their "defensive utility" to support in particular the MSDF and the ASDF.³ As the Director of the National Defense Agency noted, "a viable defense necessarily includes offensive capability."⁴ Collateral modifications have included the training of Japanese fighter pilots in the United States for air combat

training, improvement in tanks and airborne forces, and the extension of the operational ranges of anti-submarine patrol ships and aircraft. Other related changes would include the growth and influence of defense industry's and eventually the lowering of the exportation barrier of arms and equipment.⁵

Another barrier which is slowly being eroded is the notion of limiting Japan's defense expenditure to less than one percent of her GNP. With the US operating at six to seven percent and NATO countries at three to five percent, the implication of Japan capitalizing on a "free ride" from the US-Japan security alliance coupled with significant changes in the international arena may well make the probability of Japan exceeding the "one percent barrier" a more palatable proposition. On the other hand, two other limitations which are not likely to change in the decade ahead include the ban on conscription and the restriction on SDF personnel operating on foreign soil. The latter in particular should be of concern to Japan as she attempts to participate more fully in United Nations activities. Only a catastrophic series of events such as an attack on Japan could possibly lift both of these barriers. In any event, what we will see is a changing attitude toward the SDF and more importantly a moderate acceptance of the adage si vis pacem, para bellum (if you desire peace, prepare for war) as a frame of mind which accepts the probability of conflict and the futility of complete defenselessness.

Another modification in Japan's rearmament program involves the status of the US-Japan security treaty. We can anticipate some variation in the security alliance (reduction of US bases, ports, facilities, and

personnel) but nothing in the immediate future which would alter significantly the US "nuclear umbrella" over Japan. Her defense structure will continue to rely on the US deterrent capability with the intent of utilizing the SDF to thwart subversion and limited armed engagements. It is important to note, however, that as the US becomes preoccupied with events in Western Europe which continues to have a higher priority, the level of Japanese apprehension will no doubt rise in the face of new threats. That is why it is incumbent upon Japan to branch out and assume a more assertive role to help fill the void. I would propose that there are a series of measures which Japan can embark on to become more active.

To help complement the US Pacific Fleet, for example, Japan could expand her forward interceptive defense line, assume a larger role in escort missions, and enlarge her anti-submarine capability in order to meet the challenge of Soviet vessels presently in East Asia.

Additionally, there are many other areas in which the American-Japanese alliance can grow. It is imperative in this age of advanced technology and the requirement for quick decisions to meet the demands of international politics that both the US and Japan be prepared to address potential military contingencies. For instance, there is a desperate need for conducting major joint military exercises. Despite their good intentions to meet aggression, both countries have yet to work out the multitude of problems which will arise when allied forces of different languages, culture, equipment, and weapons get together. Because virtually little has been done in the area of joint readiness for war, I would surmise that the basic problem of interoperability is twice, if not three times, as bad with Japan than with America's NATO allies.⁶

In order to facilitate the implementation of an American-Japanese arrangement, a special effort ought to be made to bring Japan into the planning and the decisionmaking aspects of the NATO countries.⁷ Japan needs this type of exposure in order for her to have a full appreciation for the requirements and problems of joint operations. There is no question that a war in Europe or the Middle East will adversely affect Japan in terms of another oil embargo or the repositioning of US forces from Asia to Europe. Japan cannot afford to operate in a vacuum and should make every attempt to avail herself of the day-to-day experiences of NATO forces. Common areas of interest such as the employment of anti-submarine warfare, use of air defense resources, implementation of communication elements, and the undertaking of command and control exercises are key military activities which should prove valuable for the SDF.

Japan's space program will also continue as one of the more important developments in the next decade. With more than \$1 billion annually allocated for space technology, Japan has orbited a number of satellites and may have manned space flights in progress by 1983. The significance of her space technology along with joint ventures with the United States has the potential for establishing significant defense related programs in terms of reconnaissance satellites and monitoring devices which could greatly enhance the national security posture of both the United States and Japan in East Asia.

Finally, we can expect Japan in the next decade to approach the United States removal of ground troops from South Korea with little or no change in her domestic policy as a means of maintaining the status quo.

The withdrawal itself is not enough to necessitate a restructuring of Japan's national security program. Instead, a combination of events to include the pressures of the international environment, her perception of an increased threat, Japanese nationalism, and the surge of Japan's economic machine will be among the most influential determinants affecting the course of Japan's national security structure. As long as the United States treaty pledge is credible and the likelihood of a direct threat to Japan is perceived as remote, the pace of rearmament will be gradual and coincide with the changes of the international community. We can anticipate that Japan will follow her omni-directional approach in the decade ahead transforming and utilizing her economic strength for political and diplomatic purposes. This course of action among all others will allow her the greatest possible latitude to implement a variation of options as she reacts to the demands of international politics.

CHAPTER 6

ENDNOTES

¹Kaplan and Mushakoji, Japan, America, and the Future World Order, p. 74.

²George Packard, III, "Japan's New Nationalism," The Atlantic Monthly 211 (April 1963): 66.

³Pillsbury, p. 11.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Tsukasa Matsueda and George E. Moore, "Japan's Shifting Attitudes Towards the Military: Mitsuya Kenkyu and the Self-Defense Force." Asian Survey 7 (September 1967): 617-619.

⁶Pillsbury, pp. 23-27.

⁷Ibid.

APPENDIX

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly

international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either

Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1962, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Christian A. Herter
Douglas MacArthur II

FOR JAPAN:

Nobusuke Kishi
Aichihiro Fujiyama

Source: Martin E. Weinstein, Japans Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 139-141.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.


ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

APPENDIX B

JAPANESE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION



Ultimate command and control power over the SDF resides in the person of the Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet. The Director General of the Defense Agency, under the command and control of the Prime Minister, exercises immediate direction over SDF activities. The Ground, Maritime and Air Staff officers are headed by their respective Chiefs of Staff (Self Defense personnel), and advise the Director General on technical matters related to respective service missions. Each Chief of Staff also exercises the order of the Director General within the service branch. The Joint Staff Council advises the Director General concerning overall defense planning, etc.

Source: Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1978 (Tokyo: JDA, 1978), 233.

APPENDIX C

JAPAN'S FORCE STRUCTURE

GSDF

Strength: 155,000

Reserves: 39,000

1	Mechanized Division
12	Infantry Divisions (7-9,000 men)
1	Tank Brigade
1	Airborne Brigade
1	Composite Brigade
1	Artillery Brigade
5	Engineer Brigades
1	Signal Brigade
8	Surface-to-Air Missile Groups
1	Helicopter Wing and 34 Aviation Squadrons

MSDF

Strength: 41,000

Reserves: 600

14	Submarines
31	Destroyers
15	Frigates
12	Coastal Escorts
5	Motor Torpedo Boats
9	Coastal Patrol Craft
39	Coastal Minesweepers
6	LST's
11	Reconnaissance Squadrons
7	Helicopter Squadrons
1	Transport Squadron
5	Search and Rescue Fleets

ASDF

Strength: 44,000

3	Ground Attack Fighter Squadrons
10	Interceptor Squadrons
1	Reconnaissance Squadron
3	Transport Squadrons
1	Search and Rescue Wing
5	SAM Groups (Nike-JO)

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1978-1979, pp. 62-63.

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